The Electoral Connection in Court: How Sentencing Responds to Voter Preferences

Author(s)

Joshua Boston, Bowling Green State UniversityFollow
Bernardo S. Silveira

Document Type

Article

Abstract

Do elected judges tailor criminal sentences to the electorate’s ideology? Utilizing sentencing data from North Carolina’s Superior Courts—which transitioned from statewide to local elections in 1996—we study whether judges are obliging to voters’ preferences. We find some evidence of responsiveness: judges from liberal districts were more lenient, while those from moderately conservative districts assigned harsher sentences. Judges from increasingly conservative districts did not change their sentencing patterns, which leads to lower re-election rates. These findings suggest that judges adapt their behavior to retain office, or else they are held accountable by the public.

Copyright Statement

Publisher PDF

Creative Commons License

This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International License.

Repository Citation

Boston, Joshua and Silveira, Bernardo S., "The Electoral Connection in Court: How Sentencing Responds to Voter Preferences" (2023). Political Science Faculty Publications. 62.
https://scholarworks.bgsu.edu/poli_sci_pub/62

Publication Date

3-23-2023

Publication Title

Journal of Law and Courts

Publisher

Cambridge University Press

DOI

https://doi.org/10.1017/jlc.2022.19

Start Page No.

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End Page No.

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