Philosophy Ph.D. Dissertations

Multiple Personhood in Dissociative Identity Disorder: The Lives and Deaths of Invisible People

Date of Award

2022

Document Type

Dissertation

Degree Name

Doctor of Philosophy (Ph.D.)

Department

Philosophy, Applied

First Advisor

Sara Worley (Committee Chair)

Second Advisor

Lisa Handyside (Other)

Third Advisor

Christian Coons (Committee Member)

Fourth Advisor

Michael Weber (Committee Member)

Abstract

This dissertation asserts we have prima facie reason to believe that at least sometimes, two or more moral persons can share a single brain and body. Dissociative Identity Disorder (DID), formerly known as Multiple Personality Disorder, is a disintegration of memory, consciousness, and experience. This gives the impression of multiple personalities who alternate control of the body, only to eventually change to another personality who often has no memory of the events that transpired, or even any other personalities supposedly sharing the body. While many philosophers agree that a body can house only one person with moral rights and duties, DID cases challenge this assumption. Derek Parfit believes that to be a person is to be a continuity of causally connected mental states, including memories, intentions, experiences, and personality traits. If an alternate personality qualifies as a person, then, there exist cases in which two or more persons can share a single brain and body. Some real-life cases, then, should also be considered as examples of multiple personhood. Given that we have prima facie reason to believe some alternate personalities (“alters”) are persons, some alters may then have a right to life. Treating DID with reintegration therapy involves something like killing an alter. As such, reintegration therapy is only sometimes morally permissible, due to the asymmetric claims to the body between the original personality and an alter.

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