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APPENDIX 2:PRIVATE
STATISTICAL DISCUSSION,
DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS, AND
STATISTICAL TESTS PERFORMED ON THE DATA
STATISTICAL DISCUSSION
I have included in this second appendix descriptive statistics for each town I studied. Beginning on page 34 of this appendix, I set out statistical means and other values for different groups of voters within the towns. This data allows readers an opportunity to review and analyze the statistics apart from the quantitative methods used.
Several pages of statistical test results follow the descriptive statistics for each town. Here I offer readers an opportunity to examine the testing procedures I used to determine the significance of the variations in the statistical data.
In addition to testing differences between groups of voters within towns, I also tested for a relationship between total wealth of towns and strength of the towns' pro-ratification vote. The section giving the data and tests begins on page 65 of this appendix.
Finally, I tested the difference between town leaders and voters, both in strength of pro-ratification vote and in wealth. The section giving the data and tests begins on page 69 of this appendix.
My primary quantitative tool was the difference of means test to determine the significance of the variations in means between two groups. I also used a difference of proportions test on several occasions. Last, I used a rank-order correlation to test the relationship between wealth of Rhode Island towns and strength of anti-ratification vote. An explanation of the rank-order correlation test is given on page 65 of this appendix.
Difference of means test. I made a comparison between the statistical means (averages) of two groups of voters, one group for and one group against ratification of the Constitution. Do the data give reasonable grounds for concluding that there is a significant difference between the statistical means for these two groups?
The difference of means test proposes a "null hypothesis," that there is no significant difference of means between the two groups. The test procedure produces a "t score" which, if above a certain level (generally about 2.00), indicates that there is no evidence to support the null hypothesis. Thus, the higher the t score, the more significant the difference between the means being tested.
Difference of proportions test. This test follows generally the same procedure as the difference of means test, but instead tests the significance of a difference in proportions. The test computation gives a "z score" instead of a t score, but the two scores are comparable. I again sought a score near or above 2.00.
The test results include both a t (or z) score and a probability value. This probability indicates the likelihood that the test statistic could be obtained by chance alone. I have looked for probability values of less than .05, although I have noted as significant values as high as .10, which is a standard and accepted measure.
The test results also include "N" and "CASES," for which certain numbers are given. "N" refers to the sample size in each calculation. The case numbers correlate to the voter, tax, and estate records given by towns in Appendix 1. I have included them so that readers interested in performing their own calculations may have access to the data I used in the tests.
At the end of each test, I have indicated my decision on significance. When I decided that the test result was "significant," I also noted that I used a "one-tailed test." Had I been unsure which group would prove to have the higher mean, I would have used a two-tailed test. But since the descriptive statistics clearly showed that groups of pro-Constitution voters consistently had a larger statistical mean than anti-Constitution voters, I tested the difference of means expecting the result to favor the "Yea" voters.
DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS FOR EXETER DATA
Value Value Value
for for for
Yea Nay All
Statistic Voters Voters Taxpayers
1. a. 1787 Tax Mean 84.00 s 54.29 s 43.42 s
b. Percentage in lowest range 33.33% 21.90% 47.22%
(0 - 25 shillings)
c. Percentage in lower 0.00% 37.96% 24.05%
middling range
(26-50 shillings)
d. Percentage in upper 33.33% 29.20% 19.82%
middling range
(51-100 shillings)
e. Percentage in highest range 33.33% 10.95% 8.91%
(over 100 shillings)
2. 1788 Tax Mean 77.83 s 55.96 s
3. Voter Statistics based on 1787 Tax
a. Total voter turnout: 32.5% (147 voters; 449 taxpayers)
b. Turnout in lowest range: 15.09% (32/212)
c. Turnout in lower middling range: 48.15% (52/108)
d. Turnout in upper middling range: 47.19% (42/89)
e. Turnout in highest range: 42.50% (17/40)
SIGNIFICANCE TESTS PERFORMED ON EXETER DATA
HYPOTHESIS TEST FOR MEANS (Difference between two group means:
pooled estimate of variance)
1. Y VOTERS/N VOTERS -- 1787 TAX
GROUP 1 GROUP 2
(Y VOTERS) (N VOTERS)
MEAN = 84.0000 54.2920
STD. DEV. = 60.4119 40.8531
N = 6 137
CASES = 1 TO 6 7 TO 146
DIFFERENCE = 29.7080
STD. ERROR OF DIFFERENCE = 17.3943
T = 1.7079 (D.F. = 141)
PROB. = .0449
DECISION: SIGNIFICANT
(at the .05 level in a one-tailed test)
2. Y VOTERS/N VOTERS -- 1788 TAX
GROUP 1 GROUP 2
(Y VOTERS) (N VOTERS)
MEAN = 77.8333 55.9635
STD. DEV. = 67.3867 41.6403
N = 6 137
CASES = 1 TO 6 7 TO 146
DIFFERENCE = 21.8698
STD. ERROR OF DIFFERENCE = 17.8594
T = 1.2246 (D.F. = 141)
PROB. = .1114
DECISION: NOT SIGNIFICANT
(at the .10 level in a one-tailed test)
(T would have to be greater than 1.282)
HYPOTHESIS TEST FOR TWO PROPORTIONS FROM ONE GROUP
3. VOTERS/NON-VOTERS -- PROPORTION IN HIGHEST TAX RANGE
GROUP 1 GROUP 2
(VOTERS) (NON-VOTERS)
PROPORTION = .4250 .5750
(17/40) (23/40)
N = 40 40
Z = -.960
PROB. = .1686
DECISION: NOT SIGNIFICANT
DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS FOR HOPKINTON DATA
Value Value Value
for for for
Yea Nay All
Statistic Voters Voters Taxpayers
1. 1787 Tax Mean L 2.891 L 1.267 L 1.085
2. 1788 Tax Mean 5.903 2.835 2.615
3. 1787 Estate Valuation 359.636 153.297 134.278
4. Total voter turnout: 33.2% (128 voters; 385 taxpayers)
SIGNIFICANCE TESTS PERFORMED ON HOPKINTON DATA
HYPOTHESIS TEST FOR MEANS (Difference between two group means:
pooled estimate of variance)
1. Y VOTERS/N VOTERS -- 1787 TAX
GROUP 1 GROUP 2
(Y VOTERS) (N VOTERS)
MEAN = 2.891406 1.267440
STD. DEV. = 3.881065 1.400723
N = 32 84
CASES = 1 TO 33 34 TO 128
T = 3.326
DECISION: SIGNIFICANT
(at the .001 level in a two-tailed test)
2. Y VOTERS/N VOTERS -- 1788 TAX
GROUP 1 GROUP 2
(Y VOTERS) (N VOTERS)
MEAN = 5.902656 2.835294
STD. DEV. = 7.777901 3.196271
N = 32 85
CASES = 1 TO 33 34 TO 128
T = 3.033
DECISION: SIGNIFICANT
(at the .003 level in a two-tailed test)
2. Y VOTERS/N VOTERS -- 1787 ESTATE VALUATION
GROUP 1 GROUP 2
(Y VOTERS) (N VOTERS)
MEAN = 359.6364 153.2967
STD. DEV. = 494.1446 176.5063
N = 33 91
CASES = 1 TO 33 34 TO 128
T = 3.442
DECISION: SIGNIFICANT
(at the .001 level in a two-tailed test)
DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS FOR JAMESTOWN DATA
Value Value Value Value
for for for for
Yea Nay All Non-
Statistic Voters Voters Taxpayers Voters
1. a. 1787 Estate Mean 624.80 370.45 561.37 597.76
b. % in lowest range 20.00% 63.64% 39.06% 35.42%
( 0 - 99)
c. % in lower 40.00% 9.09% 28.13% 31.25%
middling range
( 100 - 499)
d. % in upper 20.00% 9.09% 17.19% 18.75%
middling range
( 500 - 999)
e. % in highest range 20.00% 18.18% 15.62% 14.58%
(over 1000)
2. 1787 Tax #1 Mean 99.20 s 53.40 s 81.21 s 85.21
3. 1787 Tax #2 Mean 153.60 s 88.09 s 125.72 s 131.82
4. a. 1788 Tax #3 Mean 146.60 s 74.73 s 99.65 s 100.29
b. % in lowest range 20.00% 63.64% 62.82% 66.13%
(less than 50 s)
c. % in middling 40.00% 18.18% 21.79% 20.97%
range (50 - 199 s)
d. % in highest range 40.00% 18.18% 11.54% 12.90%
(over 200 s)
5. Voter statistics based on 1788 Tax
a. Total voter turnout: 20.51% (16 voters/78 taxpayers)
b. Turnout in lowest tax range: 16.33% (8/49)
c. Turnout in middling tax range: 23.53% (4/17)
d. Turnout in highest tax range: 33.33% (4/12)
STATISTICAL TESTS PERFORMED ON JAMESTOWN DATA
HYPOTHESIS TEST FOR MEANS (Difference between two group means:
pooled estimate of variance)
1. Y VOTERS/N VOTERS -- 1787 ESTATE VALUES
GROUP 1 GROUP 2
(Y VOTERS) (N VOTERS)
MEAN = 624.8000 370.4545
STD. DEV. = 592.0095 548.9066
N = 5 11
CASES = 1 TO 5 6 TO 16
DIFFERENCE = 254.3455
STD. ERROR OF DIFFERENCE = 302.8826
T = .8397 (D.F. = 14)
PROB. = .2076
DECISION: NOT SIGNIFICANT
2. Y VOTERS/N VOTERS -- 1787 TAX #1
GROUP 1 GROUP 2
(Y VOTERS) (N VOTERS)
MEAN = 99.2000 53.4000
STD. DEV. = 83.9655 66.7686
N = 5 10
CASES = 1 TO 5 6 TO 16
DIFFERENCE = 45.8000
STD. ERROR OF DIFFERENCE = 39.7075
T = 1.1534 (D.F. = 13)
PROB. = .1347
DECISION: NOT SIGNIFICANT
3. Y VOTERS/N VOTERS -- 1787 TAX #2
GROUP 1 GROUP 2
(Y VOTERS) (N VOTERS)
MEAN = 153.6000 88.0909
STD. DEV. = 129.3457 101.8150
N = 5 11
CASES = 1 TO 5 6 TO 16
DIFFERENCE = 65.5091
STD. ERROR OF DIFFERENCE = 59.5366
T = 1.1003 (D.F. = 14)
PROB. = .1449
DECISION: NOT SIGNIFICANT
4. Y VOTERS/N VOTERS -- 1788 TAX #3
GROUP 1 GROUP 2
(Y VOTERS) (N VOTERS)
MEAN = 146.6000 74.7273
STD. DEV. = 119.9804 90.7283
N = 5 11
CASES = 1 TO 5 6 TO 16
DIFFERENCE = 71.8727
STD. ERROR OF DIFFERENCE = 53.9162
T = 1.3330 (D.F. = 14)
PROB. = .1019
DECISION: NOT SIGNIFICANT
(T would have to be greater than 1.345
at the .10 level in a one-tailed test)
5. Y VOTERS/TOTAL TAXPAYERS -- 1787 ESTATE VALUES
GROUP 1 GROUP 2
(Y VOTERS) (TOTAL TAXPAYERS)
MEAN = 624.8000 561.3692
STD. DEV. = 592.0095 867.1809
N = 5 65
CASES = 1 TO 5 1 TO 90
DIFFERENCE = 63.4308
STD. ERROR OF DIFFERENCE = 396.0841
T = .1601 (D.F. = 68)
PROB. = .4366
DECISION: NOT SIGNIFICANT
6. N VOTERS/TOTAL TAXPAYERS -- 1787 ESTATE VALUES
GROUP 1 GROUP 2
(N VOTERS) (TOTAL TAXPAYERS)
MEAN = 370.4545 561.3692
STD. DEV. = 548.9066 867.1809
N = 11 65
CASES = 6 TO 16 1 TO 90
DIFFERENCE = -190.9147
STD. ERROR OF DIFFERENCE = 271.0336
T = -.7044 (D.F. = 74)
PROB. = .2417
DECISION: NOT SIGNIFICANT
7. Y VOTERS/TOTAL TAXPAYERS -- 1787 TAX #1
GROUP 1 GROUP 2
(Y VOTERS) (TOTAL TAXPAYERS)
MEAN = 99.2000 81.2097
STD. DEV. = 83.9655 123.9893
N = 5 62
CASES = 1 TO 5 1 TO 90
DIFFERENCE = 17.9903
STD. ERROR OF DIFFERENCE = 56.6739
T = .3174 (D.F. = 65)
PROB. = .3760
DECISION: NOT SIGNIFICANT
8. N VOTERS/TOTAL TAXPAYERS -- 1787 TAX #1
GROUP 1 GROUP 2
(Y VOTERS) (TOTAL TAXPAYERS)
MEAN = 53.4000 81.2097
STD. DEV. = 66.7686 123.9893
N = 10 62
CASES = 6 TO 16 1 TO 90
DIFFERENCE = -27.8097
STD. ERROR OF DIFFERENCE = 40.2780
T = -.6904 (D.F. = 70)
PROB. = .2461
DECISION: NOT SIGNIFICANT
9. Y VOTERS/TOTAL TAXPAYERS -- 1787 TAX #2
GROUP 1 GROUP 2
(Y VOTERS) (TOTAL TAXPAYERS)
MEAN = 153.6000 125.7213
STD. DEV. = 129.3457 186.9794
N = 5 61
CASES = 1 TO 5 1 TO 90
DIFFERENCE = 27.8787
STD. ERROR OF DIFFERENCE = 85.5502
T = .3259 (D.F. = 64)
PROB. = .3728
DECISION: NOT SIGNIFICANT
10. N VOTERS/TOTAL TAXPAYERS -- 1787 TAX #2
GROUP 1 GROUP 2
(N VOTERS) (TOTAL TAXPAYERS)
MEAN = 88.0909 125.7213
STD. DEV. = 101.8150 186.9794
N = 11 61
CASES = 6 TO 16 1 TO 90
DIFFERENCE = -37.6304
STD. ERROR OF DIFFERENCE = 58.0898
T = -.6478
PROB. = .2596
DECISION: NOT SIGNIFICANT
11. Y VOTERS/TOTAL TAXPAYERS -- 1788 TAX #3
GROUP 1 GROUP 2
(Y VOTERS) (TOTAL TAXPAYERS)
MEAN = 146.6000 99.6538
STD. DEV. = 119.9804 178.6213
N = 5 78
CASES = 1 TO 5 1 TO 90
DIFFERENCE = 46.9462
STD. ERROR OF DIFFERENCE = 81.2781
T = .5776 (D.F. = 81)
PROB. = .2826
DECISION: NOT SIGNIFICANT
12. N VOTERS/TOTAL TAXPAYERS -- 1788 TAX #3
GROUP 1 GROUP 2
(N VOTERS) (TOTAL TAXPAYERS)
MEAN = 74.7273 99.6538
STD. DEV. = 90.7283 178.6213
N = 11 78
CASES = 6 TO 16 1 TO 90
DIFFERENCE = -24.9266
STD. ERROR OF DIFFERENCE = 55.0208
T = -.4530 (D.F. = 87)
PROB. = .3258
DECISION: NOT SIGNIFICANT
13. VOTERS/NON-VOTERS -- 1787 ESTATE VALUES
GROUP 1 GROUP 2
(VOTERS) (NON-VOTERS)
MEAN = 449.9375 597.7551
STD. DEV. = 556.0134 948.9838
N = 16 49
CASES = 1 TO 16 17 TO 90
DIFFERENCE = -147.8176
STD. ERROR OF DIFFERENCE = 250.9780
T = -.5890 (D.F. = 63)
PROB. = .2790
DECISION: NOT SIGNIFICANT
14. VOTERS/NON-VOTERS -- 1787 TAX #1
GROUP 1 GROUP 2
(VOTERS) (NON-VOTERS)
MEAN = 68.6667 85.2128
STD. DEV. = 73.3462 136.6800
N = 15 47
CASES = 1 TO 16 17 TO 90
DIFFERENCE = -16.5461
STD. ERROR OF DIFFERENCE = 37.0129
T = -.4470 (D.F. = 60)
PROB. = .3282
DECISION: NOT SIGNIFICANT
15. VOTERS/NON-VOTERS -- 1787 TAX #2
GROUP 1 GROUP 2
(VOTERS) (NON-VOTERS)
MEAN = 108.5625 131.8222
STD. DEV. = 111.1563 208.1278
N = 16 45
CASES = 1 TO 16 17 TO 90
DIFFERENCE = -23.2597
STD. ERROR OF DIFFERENCE = 54.7999
T = -.4244 (D.F. = 59)
PROB. = .3364
DECISION: NOT SIGNIFICANT
16. VOTERS/NON-VOTERS -- 1788 TAX #3
GROUP 1 GROUP 2
(VOTERS) (NON-VOTERS)
MEAN = 97.1875 100.2903
STD. DEV. = 102.5197 194.1332
N = 16 62
CASES = 1 TO 16 17 TO 90
DIFFERENCE = -3.1028
STD. ERROR OF DIFFERENCE = 50.4141
T = -.0615 (D.F. = 76)
PROB. = .4755
DECISION: NOT SIGNIFICANT
HYPOTHESIS TEST FOR TWO PROPORTIONS FROM ONE GROUP
17. VOTERS/NON-VOTERS -- PROPORTION IN HIGHEST RANGE
1788 TAX #3
GROUP 1 GROUP 2
(VOTERS) (NON-VOTERS)
PROPORTION = .3333 .6667
N = 12 12
Z = -1.225
PROB. = .1103
DECISION: NOT SIGNIFICANT
DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS FOR LITTLE COMPTON DATA
Value Value Value
for for for
Yea Nay All
Statistic Voters Voters Voters
1. Mean of 1798 Tax $ 2.44 $ 1.88 $ 2.20
2. Mean of 1798 Tax with
highest value removed $ 2.30 $ 1.63
from each voter group
3. Distribution of wealth
per 1798 tax:
Percentage in lowest range
(under $1.00) 18.75% 40.54% 28.24%
Percentage in lower middling
range ($1.00 - $1.99) 35.41% 37.84% 36.47%
Percentage in upper middling
range ($2.00 - $3.49) 22.92% 5.4% 15.29%
Percentage in highest range
($3.50 and over) 22.92% 16.22% 20.00%
4. Range of tax paid in each group:
Lowest tax $ 0.26 $ 0.50 $ 0.50
Second lowest tax 0.50 0.50 0.50
Highest tax 9.03 10.69 10.69
Second highest tax 7.88 5.25 9.03
6. Percentage of voters missing
from 1798 tax list 23.81% 35.09% 29.17%
SIGNIFICANCE TESTS PERFORMED ON LITTLE COMPTON DATA
HYPOTHESIS TEST FOR MEANS (Difference between two group means:
pooled estimate of variance)
1. Y VOTERS/N VOTERS -- 1798 TAX
GROUP 1 GROUP 2
(Y VOTERS) (N VOTERS)
MEAN = 2.4404 1.8789
STD. DEV. = 1.8634 1.9204
N = 48 37
CASES = 1 TO 63 64 TO 120
DIFFERENCE = .5615
STD. ERROR OF DIFFERENCE = .4131
T = 1.3592 (D.F. = 83)
PROB. = .0449
DECISION: SIGNIFICANT
(at the .10 level for a one-tailed test)
2. Y VOTERS/N VOTERS -- 1798 TAX, OUTLIERS REMOVED
(Highest value in each category [cases 1 and 113] was
removed before the statistical test was performed)
GROUP 1 GROUP 2
(Y VOTERS) (N VOTERS)
MEAN = 2.3002 1.6342
STD. DEV. = 1.6074 1.2303
N = 47 36
CASES = 1 TO 63 64 TO 120
DIFFERENCE = .6660
STD. ERROR OF DIFFERENCE = .3226
T = 2.0647 (D.F. = 81)
PROB. = .0211
DECISION: SIGNIFICANT
(at the .025 level for a one-tailed test)
HYPOTHESIS TEST FOR TWO PROPORTIONS FROM INDEPENDENT GROUPS
3. Y VOTERS/N VOTERS -- PROPORTION IN LOWEST TAX RANGE
GROUP 1 GROUP 2
(Y VOTERS) (N VOTERS)
PROPORTION = .1875 .4054
N = 48 37
MISSING CASES = 15 20
Z = -2.213
PROB. = .0135
DECISION: SIGNIFICANT
(at the .05 level for a one-tailed test)
4. Y VOTERS/N VOTERS -- PROPORTION OF VOTERS MISSING
FROM 1798 TAX LIST
GROUP 1 GROUP 2
(Y VOTERS) (N VOTERS)
PROPORTION = .2381 .3509
N = 63 57
Z = -1.358
PROB. = .0873
DECISION: SIGNIFICANT
(at the .10 level for a one-tailed test)
DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS FOR MIDDLETOWN DATA
Value for Value for
Statistic Yea Voters Nay Voters
1. a. 1783 Tax Mean 69.00 s 40.64 s
b. 1783 Tax Mean with outliers
(highest value in each voter
group) removed 34.00 s 30.60 s
2. a. 1783 Estate Value Mean 1977.00 801.63
b. 1783 Estate Value Mean with
outliers (highest value in
each voter group) removed 409.50 463.44
3. 1783 Estate Value Mean
Combined Middletown and
Portsmouth data 1595.89 559.94
STATISTICAL TESTS PERFORMED ON MIDDLETOWN DATA
HYPOTHESIS TEST FOR MEANS (Difference between two group means:
pooled estimate of variance)
1. Y VOTERS/N VOTERS -- 1783 ESTATE VALUE
GROUP 1 GROUP 2
(Y VOTERS) (N VOTERS)
MEAN = 1977.0000 801.6516
STD. DEV. = 2722.1637 1491.6627
N = 3 19
CASES = 1 TO 6 7 TO 46
DIFFERENCE = 1175.3684
STD. ERROR OF DIFFERENCE = 1029.0391
T = 1.1422 (D.F. = 20)
PROB. = .1334
DECISION: NOT SIGNIFICANT
2. Y VOTERS/N VOTERS -- 1783 ESTATE VALUE, OUTLIERS
REMOVED
GROUP 1 GROUP 2
(Y VOTERS) (N VOTERS)
MEAN = 409.5000 463.4444
STD. DEV. = 279.3072 234.6853
N = 2 18
CASES = 1 TO 6 7 TO 46
DIFFERENCE = -53.9444
STD. ERROR OF DIFFERENCE = 176.9359
T = -.3049 (D.F. = 18)
PROB. = .3820
DECISION: NOT SIGNIFICANT
3. Y VOTERS/N VOTERS -- 1783 TAX DATA
GROUP 1 GROUP 2
(Y VOTERS) (N VOTERS)
MEAN = 69.0000 40.6389
STD. DEV. = 78.6066 62.7658
N = 5 36
CASES = 1 TO 6 7 TO 46
DIFFERENCE = 28.3611
STD. ERROR OF DIFFERENCE = 30.8166
T = .9203 (D.F. = 39)
PROB. = .1815
DECISION: NOT SIGNIFICANT
4. Y VOTERS/N VOTERS -- 1783 TAX DATA, OUTLIERS REMOVED
GROUP 1 GROUP 2
(Y VOTERS) (N VOTERS)
MEAN = 34.0000 30.6000
STD. DEV. = 8.4853 17.9069
N = 4 35
CASES = 1 TO 6 7 TO 46
DIFFERENCE = 3.4000
STD. ERROR OF DIFFERENCE = 9.1493
T = .3716 (D.F. = 37)
PROB. = .3562
DECISION: NOT SIGNIFICANT
5. Y VOTERS/N VOTERS -- 1783 TAX DATA, POOLED PORTSMOUTH
AND MIDDLETOWN VALUES
GROUP 1 GROUP 2
(Y VOTERS) (N VOTERS)
MEAN = 1595.8889 559.9388
STD. DEV. = 1525.6471 962.8007
N = 9 49
CASES = 1 TO 6 (M) 7 TO 46 (M)
1 TO 12 (P) 13 TO 72 (P)
DIFFERENCE = 1035.9501
STD. ERROR OF DIFFERENCE = 385.0088
T = 2.6907 (D.F. = 56)
PROB. = .004690
DECISION: SIGNIFICANT
(at the .005 level for a one-tailed test)
DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS FOR PORTSMOUTH DATA
Value for Value for
Statistic Yea Voters Nay Voters
1. a. 1783 Estate Value Mean 1405.33 406.87
b. Percentage of 1783 estates
in lowest range 0.00% 70.00%
( 500 or less)
b. Percentage of 1783 estates
in middling range
( 501 - 1000) 33.33% 26.67%
c. Percentage of 1783 estates
in highest range
(over 1000) 66.67% 3.33%
2. a. 1798 Tax Data Mean $ 3.51 $ 1.87
b. 1798 Tax Data Mean,
Outliers (highest value in
each voter category) removed 2.02 1.74
STATISTICAL TESTS PERFORMED ON PORTSMOUTH DATA
HYPOTHESIS TESTS FOR MEANS (Difference between two group means:
pooled estimate of variance)
1. Y VOTERS/N VOTERS -- 1783 ESTATE VALUES
GROUP 1 GROUP 2
(Y VOTERS) (N VOTERS)
MEAN = 1405.3333 406.8667
STD. DEV. = 793.3268 301.2287
N = 6 30
CASES = 1 TO 12 13 TO 72
DIFFERENCE = 998.4667
STD. ERROR OF DIFFERENCE = 184.3631
T = 5.4158 (D.F. = 34)
PROB. = .000002476
DECISION: SIGNIFICANT
(at the highest level of significance for
a one-tailed test)
2. Y VOTERS/N VOTERS -- 1798 TAX DATA
GROUP 1 GROUP 2
(Y VOTERS) (N VOTERS)
MEAN = 3.5110 1.8715
STD. DEV. = 5.0018 1.3080
N = 10 41
CASES = 1 TO 12 13 TO 72
DIFFERENCE = 1.6395
STD. ERROR OF DIFFERENCE = .8633
T = 1.8991 (D.F. = 49)
PROB. = .0317
DECISION: SIGNIFICANT
(at the .05 level for a one-tailed test)
3. Y VOTERS/N VOTERS -- 1798 TAX DATA, OUTLIERS REMOVED
GROUP 1 GROUP 2
(Y VOTERS) (N VOTERS)
MEAN = 2.0167 1.7443
STD. DEV. = 1.7389 1.0365
N = 9 40
CASES = 1 TO 12 13 TO 72
DIFFERENCE = .2724
STD. ERROR OF DIFFERENCE = .4375
T = .6227 (D.F. = 47)
PROB. = .2682
DECISION: NOT SIGNIFICANT
DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS FOR TIVERTON DATA
Value Value Value Value
for for for for
Yea Nay All Non-
Statistic Voters Voters Taxpayers Voters
1. 1784 Total Tax Mean 79.19 s 41.68 s -- --
2. a. 1788 Total Tax Mean 129.13 s 48.95 s 48.14 s 39.26
b. % in lowest tax
range (0 - 24 s) 26.09% 49.43% 62.23% 73.36%
c. % in middling tax
range (25 - 99 s) 26.09% 36.78% 22.76% 15.72%
d. % in highest tax
range (over 99 s) 47.83% 13.79% 15.01% 10.92%
3. a. 1788 Personal Estate
Tax Mean 9.61 s 1.62 s 4.13 s 4.79
b. % in lowest tax range
(less than 5 s) 43.48% 87.36% 81.60% 82.53%
c. % who paid no
personal estate tax 17.39% 59.77% 59.80% 57.64%
4. a. 1788 Real Estate
Tax Mean 113.96 s 41.72 s 39.11 s 28.50
b. % in lowest tax range
(less than 30 s) 31.58% 63.95% 72.64% 82.06%
c. % who paid no
real estate tax 26.09% 16.09% 36.32% 55.90%
DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS FOR TIVERTON DATA
(continued)
5. Voter statistics based on 1788 Tax
a. Total voter turnout: 33.9% (115 voters; 339 polls paid)
b. Turnout in lower tax range: 22.58% (49/217)
(0 -24 shillings)
c. Turnout in middling tax range: 51.35% (38/74)
(25 - 99 shillings)
d. Turnout in upper tax range: 47.92% (23/48)
(over 99 shillings)
SIGNIFICANCE TESTS PERFORMED ON TIVERTON DATA
HYPOTHESIS TEST FOR MEANS (Difference between two group means:
pooled estimate of variance)
1. Y VOTERS/N VOTERS -- 1784 TAX
GROUP 1 GROUP 2
(Y VOTERS) (N VOTERS)
MEAN = 79.1905 41.6842
STD. DEV. = 75.2001 66.0558
N = 21 76
CASES = 1 TO 23 24 TO 115
DIFFERENCE = 37.5063
STD. ERROR OF DIFFERENCE = 16.7845
T = 2.2346 (D.F. = 95)
PROB. = .0139
DECISION: SIGNIFICANT
(at the .025 level for a one-tailed test)
2. Y VOTERS/N VOTERS -- 1788 TOTAL TAX
GROUP 1 GROUP 2
(Y VOTERS) (N VOTERS)
MEAN = 129.1304 48.9540
STD. DEV. = 126.4168 80.1483
N = 23 87
CASES = 1 TO 23 24 TO 115
DIFFERENCE = 80.1764
STD. ERROR OF DIFFERENCE = 21.4512
T = 3.7376 (D.F. = 108)
PROB. = .00001495
DECISION: SIGNIFICANT
(at the highest level for a one-tailed test)
3. Y VOTERS/N VOTERS -- 1788 PERSONAL ESTATE TAX
GROUP 1 GROUP 2
(Y VOTERS) (N VOTERS)
MEAN = 9.6087 1.6207
STD. DEV. = 17.1643 2.5980
N = 23 87
CASES = 1 TO 23 24 TO 115
DIFFERENCE = 7.9880
STD. ERROR OF DIFFERENCE = 1.8959
T = 4.2132 (D.F. = 108)
PROB. = .000002619
DECISION: SIGNIFICANT
(at the highest level for a one-tailed test)
4. Y VOTERS/N VOTERS -- 1788 REAL ESTATE TAX
GROUP 1 GROUP 2
(Y VOTERS) (N VOTERS)
MEAN = 113.9565 41.7241
STD. DEV. = 118.0791 78.7898
N = 23 87
CASES = 1 TO 23 24 TO 115
DIFFERENCE = 72.2324
STD. ERROR OF DIFFERENCE = 20.6852
T = 3.4920 (D.F. = 108)
PROB. = .00003479
DECISION: SIGNIFICANT
(at the highest level for a one-tailed test)
HYPOTHESIS TEST FOR MEANS (Mean vs. hypothesized value)
5. Y VOTERS/ALL TAXPAYERS -- 1788 TOTAL TAX
HYPOTHESIZED VALUE = 48.1404 (MEAN OF ALL TAXPAYERS)
MEAN = 129.1304 (Y VOTERS)
STD. DEV.= 126.4168
STD. ERROR = 26.3597
N = 23 (CASES 1 TO 23)
T = 3.0725 (D.F. = 22)
PROB. = .0002786
DECISION: SIGNIFICANT
(at the highest level for a one-tailed test)
6. N VOTERS/ALL TAXPAYERS -- 1788 TOTAL TAX
HYPOTHESIZED VALUE = 48.1404 (MEAN OF ALL TAXPAYERS)
MEAN = 48.9540 (N VOTERS)
STD. DEV.= 80.1483
STD. ERROR = 8.5928
N = 87 (CASES 24 TO 115)
T = .0947 (D.F. = 86)
PROB. = .4624
DECISION: NOT SIGNIFICANT
7. Y VOTERS/ALL TAXPAYERS -- 1788 PERSONAL ESTATE TAX
HYPOTHESIZED VALUE = 4.1308 (MEAN OF ALL TAXPAYERS)
MEAN = 9.6087 (Y VOTERS)
STD. DEV.= 17.1643
STD. ERROR = 3.5790
N = 23 (CASES 1 TO 23)
T = 1.5306 (D.F. = 22)
PROB. = .0701
DECISION: SIGNIFICANT
(at the .10 level for a one-tailed test)
8. N VOTERS/ALL TAXPAYERS -- 1788 PERSONAL ESTATE TAX
HYPOTHESIZED VALUE = 4.1308 (MEAN OF ALL TAXPAYERS)
MEAN = 1.6207 (N VOTERS)
STD. DEV.= 2.5980
STD. ERROR = .2785
N = 87 (CASES 24 TO 115)
T = -9.0117 (D.F. = 86)
PROB. = .000000000000006
DECISION: SIGNIFICANT
(at the highest level for a one-tailed test)
9. Y VOTERS/ALL TAXPAYERS -- 1788 REAL ESTATE TAX
HYPOTHESIZED VALUE = 39.1090 (MEAN OF ALL TAXPAYERS)
MEAN = 113.9565 (Y VOTERS)
STD. DEV.= 118.0791
STD. ERROR = 24.6212
N = 23 (CASES 1 TO 23)
T = 3.0400 (D.F. = 22)
PROB. = .0003005
DECISION: SIGNIFICANT
(at the highest level for a one-tailed test)
10. N VOTERS/ALL TAXPAYERS -- 1788 REAL ESTATE TAX
HYPOTHESIZED VALUE = 39.1090 (MEAN OF ALL TAXPAYERS)
MEAN = 41.7241 (N VOTERS)
STD. DEV.= 78.7898
STD. ERROR = 8.4472
N = 87 (CASES 24 TO 115)
T = .3096 (D.F. = 86)
PROB. = .3788
DECISION: NOT SIGNIFICANT
11. VOTERS/NON-VOTERS -- 1788 TOTAL TAX
HYPOTHESIZED VALUE = 39.2576 (MEAN OF NON-VOTERS)
MEAN = 65.7182 (VOTERS)
STD. DEV.= 96.7814
STD. ERROR = 9.2277
N = 110 (CASES 1 TO 115)
T = 2.8675 (D.F. = 109)
PROB. = .0002484
DECISION: SIGNIFICANT
(at the highest level for a one-tailed test)
12. VOTERS/NON-VOTERS -- 1788 PERSONAL ESTATE TAX
HYPOTHESIZED VALUE = 4.7991 (MEAN OF NON-VOTERS)
MEAN = 3.2909 (VOTERS)
STD. DEV.= 8.6855
STD. ERROR = .8281
N = 110 (CASES 1 TO 115)
T = -1.8212 (D.F. = 109)
PROB. = .0357
DECISION: SIGNIFICANT
(at the .05 level for a one-tailed test)
13. VOTERS/NON-VOTERS -- 1788 REAL ESTATE TAX
HYPOTHESIZED VALUE = 28.5022 (MEAN OF NON-VOTERS)
MEAN = 56.8273 (VOTERS)
STD. DEV.= 92.6433
STD. ERROR = 8.8332
N = 110 (CASES 1 TO 115)
T = 3.2067 (D.F. = 109)
PROB. = .0008814
DECISION: SIGNIFICANT
(at the .005 level for a one-tailed test)
HYPOTHESIS TEST FOR TWO PROPORTIONS FROM INDEPENDENT GROUPS
14. Y VOTERS/N VOTERS -- PROPORTION WHO PAID 0.00 PERSONAL
ESTATE TAX
GROUP 1 GROUP 2
(Y VOTERS) (N VOTERS)
PROPORTION = .1739 .5977
N = 23 87
MISSING CASES = 0 5
Z = -3.616
PROB. = .0001498
DECISION: SIGNIFICANT
(at the highest level for a one-tailed test)
15. Y VOTERS/N VOTERS -- PROPORTION WHO PAID 0.00 REAL
ESTATE TAX
GROUP 1 GROUP 2
(Y VOTERS) (N VOTERS)
PROPORTION = .2609 .1609
N = 23 87
MISSING CASES = 0 5
Z = 1.106
PROB. = .1344
DECISION: NOT SIGNIFICANT
HYPOTHESIS TEST FOR TWO PROPORTIONS FROM ONE GROUP
16. VOTERS/NON-VOTERS -- PROPORTION IN UPPER RANGE 1788 TAX
GROUP 1 GROUP 2
(VOTERS) (NON-VOTERS)
PROPORTION = .4250 .5208
(23/48) (25/48)
N = 48 48
Z = -.288
PROB. = .3865
DECISION: NOT SIGNIFICANT
RANK-ORDER TEST FOR RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN TOWN WEALTH
AND STRENGTH OF PRO-RATIFICATION VOTE
My goal in this test was to determine if there was a relationship between the strength of a town's vote for ratification and the per capita wealth of the town. I converted each town's vote to a percentage score by dividing the pro-ratification vote by the total vote. In the six cases where there was no pro-ratification vote whatever, I ranked the towns according to the number of votes cast against ratification. In these six cases, I recorded the vote as .00000, but I also included, in parentheses, the number of anti-ratification votes cast.
In order to rank the towns by wealth, I drew on an official estimate of houses and land made in 1783. To arrive at an average wealth in each town, I divided the total town wealth by the number of households listed in the 1782 census. This gave me a mean "per household" wealth for each town.
I used a rank-order test which produces a correlation coefficient, Spearman's rs, indicating the strength of the relationship between the two variables (pro-ratification vote and wealth of town) by which the data is ranked. If there is a perfect positive or negative correlation between the two variables, the rs would be +1.00 or -1.00. If there is no relation whatsoever between the two variables, the rs would be 0.00. The closer rs is to + or - 1.00, the stronger the relationship; the closer rs is to 0.00, the weaker the relationship.
The correlation coefficient is determined by the following formula:
6 Di2
rs = 1 -
N(N2 - 1),
where Di is the difference between the two rankings of each case and N is the total number of cases.
Using the data given on the following pages, I computed the correlation coefficients (rs score) as 0.01902. This small coefficient indicates that there is virtually no relationship (either negative or positive) between pro-ratification voting strength and the per household wealth of the town.
RHODE ISLAND TOWNS:
PRO-RATIFICATION STRENGTH AND TOWN WEALTH
RANKINGS
1783
Pro- Mean
Ratif. Vote Household Wealth
Town Vote Rank Wealth Rank Di Di2
Barrington .20930 24 $ 897.67 6.5 17.5 306.25
Bristol .53061 28 2098.23 26 2 4
Charlestown .10526 19 1188.78 12 7 49
Coventry .00000 1 1103.61 10 -9 81
(180)
Cranston .00000 4 1422.27 15 -11 121
(101)
Cumberland .08130 18 1601.65 17 1 1
East Greenwich .02151 14 855.04 5 9 81
Exeter .04054 16 733.14 2 14 196
1783
Pro- Mean
Ratif. Vote Household Wealth
Town Vote Rank Wealth Rank Di Di2
Foster .00000 2 1655.04 19 -17 289
(177)
Glocester .03797 15 1285.45 13 2 4
Hopkinton .25781 25 $ 812.59 3 22 484
Jamestown .31250 26 1777.89 23.5 2.5 6.25
Johnston .01250 9.5 1149.93 11 -1.5 2.25
Little Compton .52500 27 1667.73 20 7 49
Middletown .13043 20 2595.20 28 -8 64
New Shoreham .00000 6 1777.89 23.5 -17.5 306.25
(32)
North Kingston .01235 8 993.21 9 -1 1
No. Providence .00000 5 1935.70 25 -20 400
(48)
Portsmouth .16667 21 2101.59 27 -6 36
Richmond .01449 12 608.03 1 11 121
Scituate .00000 3 1505.31 16 -13 169
(156)
Smithfield .01250 9.5 1732.89 22 -12.5 156.25
South Kingston .00794 7 1723.52 21 -14 196
Tiverton .20000 23 1369.23 14 9 81
Warren .04651 17 897.67 6.5 10.5 110.25
Warwick .02098 13 1621.16 18 -5 25
Westerly .17647 22 956.86 8 14 196
West Greenwich .01361 11 815.47 4 7 49
3584.5
TOWN LEADERS AND THE REFERENDUM VOTE
In this section, I examine the way in which town leaders voted. My goal was to determine if there was a significant difference between the referendum vote of the "fathers of the town" and that of the other freemen.
I selected for study those town officers that Edward Cook calls the "major officers" of New England towns: town clerk, town councilmen, town sergeant, and town treasurer. Of the six towns I studied, five elected six town councilmen annually; Jamestown, perhaps because of its smaller size, elected only four. On the following pages I have set out the offices, the names of the officeholders, their votes, and the taxes they paid or estate they held.
I have also compiled descriptive statistics for these town leaders, in which I compare the strength of pro-ratification sentiment of all voters to that of town leaders who voted. I also compare the mean wealth of all who townsmen who voted to the mean wealth of the town leaders who voted.
Finally, I include the significance tests I used on the town leaders data. The results show that the town leaders were significantly more pro-ratification than the rest of the voters. However, there is no consistent significant difference in wealth between town leaders and the rest of the voters. In several towns, the difference in wealth is significant, but in other towns it is not.
LEADERS OF THE TOWNS UNDER STUDY
1787-1788 Tax or
Office Officeholder Vote Estate
EXETER (1787 Tax)
Town Clerk Stephen Reynolds N 43 s
Town Councilmen Jeffery Willcox, Esq. N 29
Samuel Bissel N 27
Abraham Willcox, Jr. N 59
Charles Tripp --
Lillibridge Barber N 93
Benjamin Wait N 98
Town Sergeant Isaac Willcox N 70
Town Treasurer John Whitford N 134
JAMESTOWN (1788 Tax)
Town Clerk Tiddeman Hull --
Town Councilman John Howland N 120 s
Samuel Carr --
Isaac Howland Y 81
James Carr --
Town Sergeant Abel Franklin N 15
Town Treasurer James Carr, Jr. --
1787-1788 Tax or
Office Officeholder Vote Estate
LITTLE COMPTON (1798 Tax)
Town Clerk Adam Simmons Y $ 2.32
Town Councilmen Aaron Willbur Y 1.95
Thomas Palmer N 0.89
John Davis Y 4.29
Ebenezer Church Y 1.77
James Brownell --
William Southworth Y 2.25
Town Sergeant Barnabas Clap Y --
Town Treasurer John Peckham --
MIDDLETOWN (1783 Tax)
Town Clerk Elisha Allen --
Town Councilmen Nicholas Easton Y 209 s
William Peckham, Jr. N 30
James Potter Y 36
Parker Hall --
Benjamin Gardner --
William Taggart, Jr. --
Town Sergeant John Coggeshall N 10
Town Treasurer Elisha Barker Y 22
1787-1788 Tax or
Office Officeholder Vote Estate
PORTSMOUTH (1783 Estate)
Town Clerk Abraham Anthony, Jr. --
Town Councilmen Jonathan Freeborn N 870
William Hall N --
Giles Lawton, Jr. Y 527
George Hall N 509
Giles Slocum, Jr. N 541
Samuel Pearce, Jr. --
Town Sergeant Noah Gray --
Town Treasurer John Shearman --
TIVERTON (1788 Tax)
Town Clerk Walter Cook N 36 s
Town Councilmen John Bowen, Esq. --
John Stafford N 156
Earle Taber --
Lemuel Taber, Esq. Y 8
Gamaliel Warren N 29
Philip Sisson N 252
Town Sergeant Benjamin Sawdy N 29
Town Treasurer John Howland --
DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS FOR TOWN LEADERS
Percentage Percentage
Pro-ratification Pro-ratification
Vote Vote Among
Town Among All Voters Voting Town Leaders
Exeter 4.05% 0.00%
(1 did not vote)
Jamestown 31.25% 33.33%
(4 did not vote)
Little Compton 52.50% 85.71%
(2 did not vote)
Middletown 13.04% 60.00%
(4 did not vote)
Portsmouth 16.67% 20.00%
(4 did not vote)
Tiverton 20.00% 16.67%
(3 did not vote)
Total of Town Leaders who voted yea: 12
Total of Town Leaders who voted nay: 22
Percentage Pro-ratification vote among all town leaders: 35.29%
Percentage Pro-ratification vote among all towns studied: 22.24%
DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS FOR TOWN LEADERS
(continued)
Mean of Mean of
Town All Voters Voting Town Leaders
Exeter
(1787 Tax) 55.5385 s 69.125 s
Jamestown
(1788 Tax) 97.1875 s 72.000 s
Little Compton
(1798 Tax) $ 2.20 $ 2.245
Middletown
(1783 Tax) 44.0976 s 61.40 s
Portsmouth
(1783 Estate) 573.2778 611.75
Tiverton
(1788 Tax) 65.7182 s 85.00 s
SIGNIFICANCE TESTS PERFORMED ON TOWN LEADER DATA
HYPOTHESIS TEST FOR TWO PROPORTIONS FROM ONE GROUP
(overlapping categories)
1. TOWN LEADERS/ALL VOTERS -- PROPORTION FOR RATIFICATION
GROUP 1 GROUP 2
(TOWN LEADERS) (ALL VOTERS)
PROPORTION = .3529 .2224
OVERLAPPING PROPORTION = .0658
N = 517
Z = 4.542
PROB. = .000002783
DECISION: SIGNIFICANT
(at the highest level for a one-tailed test)
HYPOTHESIS TEST FOR MEANS (Mean vs. hypothesized value)
2. EXETER: TOWN LEADERS/ALL VOTERS -- 1787 TAX
HYPOTHESIZED VALUE = 69.1250 (MEAN OF TOWN LEADERS)
MEAN = 55.5385 (ALL VOTERS)
STD. DEV.= 41.9844
STD. ERROR = 3.5109
N = 143 (CASES 1 TO 146)
T = -3.8698 (D.F. = 142)
PROB. = .00008273
DECISION: SIGNIFICANT
(at the highest level for a one-tailed test)
3. JAMESTOWN: TOWN LEADERS/ALL VOTERS -- 1788 TAX
HYPOTHESIZED VALUE = 72.0000 (MEAN OF TOWN LEADERS)
MEAN = 97.1875 (ALL VOTERS)
STD. DEV.= 102.5197
STD. ERROR = 25.6299
N = 16 (CASES 1 TO 16)
T = .9827 (D.F. = 15)
PROB. = .1707
DECISION: NOT SIGNIFICANT
4. LITTLE COMPTON: TOWN LEADERS/ALL VOTERS -- 1798 TAX
HYPOTHESIZED VALUE = 2.2450 (MEAN OF TOWN LEADERS)
MEAN = 2.1960 (ALL VOTERS)
STD. DEV.= 1.8979
STD. ERROR = .2059
N = 85 (CASES 1 TO 120)
T = -.2380 (D.F. = 84)
PROB. = .4062
DECISION: NOT SIGNIFICANT
5. MIDDLETOWN: TOWN LEADERS/ALL VOTERS -- 1783 TAX
HYPOTHESIZED VALUE = 61.4000 (MEAN OF TOWN LEADERS)
MEAN = 44.0976 (ALL VOTERS)
STD. DEV.= 64.4460
STD. ERROR = 10.0648
N = 41 (CASES 1 TO 46)
T = -1.7191 (D.F. = 40)
PROB. = .0467
DECISION: SIGNIFICANT
(at the .05 level for a one-tailed test)
6. PORTSMOUTH: TOWN LEADERS/ALL VOTERS -- 1783 ESTATE
HYPOTHESIZED VALUE = 611.7500 (MEAN OF TOWN LEADERS)
MEAN = 573.2778 (ALL VOTERS)
STD. DEV.= 554.5381
STD. ERROR = 92.4230
N = 36 (CASES 1 TO 72)
T = -.4163 (D.F. = 35)
PROB. = .3399
DECISION: NOT SIGNIFICANT
7. TIVERTON: TOWN LEADERS/ALL VOTERS -- 1788 TAX
HYPOTHESIZED VALUE = 85.0000 (MEAN OF TOWN LEADERS)
MEAN = 65.7182 (ALL VOTERS)
STD. DEV.= 96.7814
STD. ERROR = 9.2277
N = 110 (CASES 1 TO 115)
T = -2.0895 (D.F. = 109)
PROB. = .0195
DECISION: SIGNIFICANT
(at the .025 level for a one-tailed test)
For readers who wish to have a fuller explanation than I give here of the quantitative methods used, I recommend Hubert M. Blalock, Jr., Social Statistics, 2nd ed. (New York: McGraw-Hill, Inc., 1979).
The Tiverton Tax Book for 1788 shows that 337 taxpayers also paid polls; however, two voters (John Durfee and Ephraim Davenport) did not pay any poll tax. Thus, the total base of eligible voters is 339.
The strongest pro-ratification vote is 28, the weakest pro-ratification vote is 1.
This figure represents the wealth per household in each Rhode Island town. I arrived at this figure by dividing the total value of houses and wealth in each town ("Estimate Houses and Land," in folder "Rateable Property Portsmouth 1783," Rhode Island State Archives, Drawer C-18) by the number of households in the town, as given in the 1782 census (Holbrook, v).
The town with the greatest wealth is ranked 28; the town with the least wealth is ranked 1. Had Newport and Providence been included in this ranking, they would have rated as follows: Newport, with a mean household wealth of $963.29, would have ranked 8; Providence, with a mean household wealth of $1663.29, would have ranked 21.
NOTE: The valuation for 1783 combined Jamestown and New Shoreham into one figure and combined Warren and Barrington into one figure. To arrive at a reasonable estimate of the wealth of each individual town, I figured the proportion for each town based on the population figures from the 1782 census records.
Edward M. Cook, Jr., The Fathers of the Towns: Leadership and Community Structure in Eighteenth-Century New England (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1976), 1-2.
Exeter Town Meeting, 3 June 1787, Town Meeting Records, 3: 1779-1805 (Exeter Town Clerk's Office), 5.
Jamestown Town Meeting, 18 April 1787, Town Meeting Records, 3: 1744-1796 (Jamestown Town Clerk's Office), 309.
Little Compton Town Meeting, 28 August 1787, Town Meeting Records, 2: 1759-1865 (Little Compton Town Clerk's Office), 64.
Middletown Town Meeting, 23 May 1787, Town Meeting Records 1: 1743-1808 (Middletown Town Clerk's Office), 170-71.
Portsmouth Town Meeting, 4 June 1787, Town Meeting Records 2: 1786-1835 (Portsmouth Town Clerk's Office), 13.
Tiverton Town Meeting, 21 May 1787, Town Meeting Records 1: 1754-1798 (Tiverton Town Clerk's Office), 174.
Appendix-page \* arabic38
EXETER
Appendix-page \* arabic39
EXETER
Appendix-page \* arabic40
HOPKINTON
Appendix-page \* arabic43
JAMESTOWN
Appendix-page \* arabic47
LITTLE COMPTON
Appendix-page \* arabic55
MIDDLETOWN
Appendix-page \* arabic58
PORTSMOUTH
Appendix-page \* arabic62
TIVERTON
Appendix-page \* arabic66
RANK-ORDER
Appendix-page \* arabic73
TOWN LEADERS
Appendix-page \* arabic76
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