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Federal Aid, Black Separatism, and the Public Schools

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Abstract

In 1967, President Johnson announced the creation of the Model Cities program to give special grants to cities that developed comprehensive plans enlisting federal, state, local, and private resources to transform blighted areas into useful ones. Dayton, Ohio was among the first cities to have such a program, and it was directed by African American residents from the section known as the inner west. While these community activists instituted important reforms within the schools and the neighborhoods where low income African American families lived, they frustrated efforts to racially desegregate the public schools. Consequently, the story of Dayton's Model Cities Demonstration Project raises the important question whether urban renewal and school improvement can be accomplished while maintaining segregated conditions.

In northern cities, the civil rights movement had at least two parts. One part was the legal suits the NAACP directed against segregated school districts. The legal cases in the north tried to dismantle the racial segregation of schools caused by racially separate neighborhoods. For example, in Miliken v. Bradley, the NAACP sought to integrate White children from suburban communities with the Black children in Detroit. In part, because of dismay over the slowness of desegregation, other African Americans took another direction. Some community activists asked for reforms within the schools and the neighborhoods where low income Black families lived. In places such as Dayton, Ohio, reporters sometimes called these activists "Black separatists".

Interestingly, the federal government aided both groups. NAACP lawyers found the federal courts to be amenable to the changes they requested. The second group, called Black separatists, found the Model Cities program a source of millions of dollars for activities they wanted to begin. While these two efforts appear distinct, they represent intrusions by the federal government into local school affairs. NAACP lawyers wanted the federal courts to change court-ordered desegregation and the Model Cities program would help residents direct the federal efforts in 1966 to reinforce the authority of the community action agencies. Sundquist says that there are many reasons why community action agencies failed. One reason is that those agencies never occupied seats of authority in their local communities. For example, southern communities saw the community action agencies as extensions of the civil rights movement that the White leadership distrusted. Another reason is the community action agencies grew quickly and created projects without careful planning. Sundquist believes the federal government encouraged the chaotic growth of community action agencies. He says that the Office of Economic Opportunity approved "individual projects that would not be inconsistent with the comprehensive plans when and as they were developed" (1969, p. 39). Consequently, individual communities did not study their problems but submitted applications indiscriminately. In response, the "DEO ... began to set its own priorities in "national emphasis programs"" (Sundquist, 1969, p. 42). Among these were Operation Head Start, legal services, comprehensive health services, foster grandparents, and Upward Bound. The result was that community action agencies could no longer devise plans to fit the local conditions. Despite efforts in 1966 to reinforce the authority of the community action agencies, the results were disappointing. In 1967, Sundquist visited several community action agencies around the country. He found that they were unable to carry out their proposed functions of community-wide planning, mobilization, and coordination.

The National Model Cities Program

During the 1960s, the federal government intervened in a wide range of local community affairs. According to James Sundquist (1969), foremost among these efforts was the Economic Opportunity Act of 1964. Designed for urban and rural areas, this Act called for locally initiated comprehensive community action programs to focus a variety of resources on the roots of poverty. The hope was that, in each community, community action agencies would bring together separate efforts sponsored by the federal, state, and local governments to create a unified approach. Unfortunately, the job was too large for the community action agencies. Sundquist says that there are many reasons why community action agencies failed. One reason is that those agencies never occupied seats of authority in their local communities. For example, southern communities saw the community action agencies as extensions of the civil rights movement that the White leadership distrusted. Another reason is the community action agencies grew quickly and created projects without careful planning. Sundquist believes the federal government encouraged the chaotic growth of community action agencies. He says that the Office of Economic Opportunity approved "individual projects that would not be inconsistent with the comprehensive plans when and as they were developed" (1969, p. 39). Consequently, individual communities did not study their problems but submitted applications indiscriminately. In response, the "DEO ... began to set its own priorities in "national emphasis programs"" (Sundquist, 1969, p. 42). Among these were Operation Head Start, legal services, comprehensive health services, foster grandparents, and Upward Bound. The result was that community action agencies could no longer devise plans to fit the local conditions. Despite efforts in 1966 to reinforce the authority of the community action agencies, the results were disappointing. In 1967, Sundquist visited several community action agencies around the country. He found that they were unable to carry out their proposed functions of community-wide planning, mobilization, and coordination.

Less than three years after forming community action agencies, President Johnson announced the creation of the Model Cities program to give special grants to cities that developed comprehensive plans that enlisted federal, state, local, and private resources to transform blighted areas into...
by West Dayton residents. Black, and 32% of whom had annual incomes of less than $3000 (Staff Report, 1969).

The Model Cities program included two important changes from the community action agencies. First, Model Cities required that comprehensive and coordinated planning take place before any action began. As a result, cities applied for planning grants to submit proposals. If the U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development accepted a proposal, it gave the winning city another year to perfect five-year action plans. Second, in order to receive a Model Cities grant, proposals had to show evidence of citizen participation in the planning and execution of the program.

In November 1966, despite waning support for the War on Poverty, the U.S. Congress approved most of the Model Cities program that the President had submitted. Congress reduced the funding, dropped a provision calling for racial integration of housing, prohibited HUD from requiring school busing as a precondition of assistance, and eliminated the requirement for each city to have a federal coordinator (Sundquist, 1969, p. 82).

Dayton Model Cities Demonstration Project

When the U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development set a deadline of May 1, 1967 for initial proposals, Dayton, Ohio was ready to apply. Dayton’s city manager had recently hired an administrative assistant to coordinate all federal programs. The city had just finished a five-year study funded by the U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development that fit the Model Cities program. This study recommended improvement of the city’s economic base, aggressive enforcement of building codes and housing rehabilitation, and extension of self-help programs to urban dwellers. In May 1966, Dayton’s City Commission assigned an agency, named the Special Committee On Urban Renewal (SCOUR) to prepare a draft application. The agency hired a university professor as a consultant who picked West Dayton as the focus of the Model Cities application. West Dayton contained 30% of Dayton’s substandard housing. The area had a population of 42,000 residents, 92% of whom were Black, and 32% of whom had annual incomes of less than $3000 (Staff Report, 1969).

On September 1, 1966, some residents of West Dayton rioted briefly but dramatically. The television and newspaper accounts confirmed the view that West Dayton should receive the attention of Model Cities. When SCOUR released the preliminary draft in December 1966, a group of African Americans complained that the people who lived in the area had not helped prepare it. They claimed the program shortchanged the residents. (Staff Report, 1969). In January 1967, when HUD distributed guidelines for the program, SCOUR revised the draft application to include the concerns voiced by West Dayton residents.
signatures on petitions asking that their neighborhood associations no longer be considered part of Model Cities. They withdrew their petitions when the Planning Council promised to meet with them to find ways to settle the difficulties (Dansker, 1968).

In June 1968, Battelle Memorial Institute released an evaluation of Dayton’s Model City program. It repeated the charge that the Planning Council failed to involve the residents in decisions. The report said that a few people made the major decisions about programs. Furthermore, the Battelle report said the Planning Council had a poor public information program that caused area residents to form unrealistic expectations. Battelle’s report laid the blame on the Model Cities Planning Council; it said the members had developed internal solidarity fighting for a strong role. Unfortunately, those same members tended to ignore important programmatic considerations, and they had weak ties to the community (Goodman, 1968b).

The power the Planning Council held made the Dayton Model Cities Demonstration Project unique. No other program approved by HUD allowed target area citizens to have equal authority with the city administration. To some extent, federal officials saw this as a risk. The director of Model Cities Administration in New York said that “it is the city’s responsibility to delineate the extent of citizen responsibility”. He saw citizen participation as dangerous when the group decided to act on its own. While he praised Dayton’s coalition between citizens and city hall, he noted that his confidence was “based on the City Manager’s ability to stay on top of the program” (Goldwyn, 1968).

Evaluators commissioned by HUD to study similar programs in eleven cities revealed the unique nature of Dayton’s Model Cities Demonstration Project. Released in 1970, the report by Marshall Kaplan, Gans, and Kahn, Inc. noted that Dayton, Ohio was the only program where the residents dominated the planning responsibilities. The report said that in Dayton’s case, the existence of a cohesive resident base enabled them to exert dominance. However, it added that Dayton’s city manager was continually involved in the Model Cities program offering visible public support. Unfortunately, since residents inexperienced with government regulations dominated Dayton’s program, the proposal ignored many of HUD’s guidelines (Staff Report, 1970).

Model Cities and the Board of Education

Resident domination of Dayton’s Model Cities education component led to conflicts with the Board of Education. In general, the School Board supported Model Cities. For example, on June 27, 1968, the Board announced the creation of an Integration Advisory Council to report directly to the Board. The members of the Advisory Council came from all sections of the city including the West Dayton. In addition, at the same June 1968 meeting, the Board appointed 31 building administrators, 16 of whom were Black (Laskay, 1968). However, thirty White supporters of the Model Cities Planning Council who attended the School Board meeting in June 1968 did not see these changes as improvements. They shouted, “Black control of Black schools.” They claimed they favored integration, but since there were Black schools, they thought Blacks should control them. An African American employee of the juvenile detention center objected saying that “Black control of Black schools means White control of White schools” (Plan Rebuked, 1968).

At first, the Model Cities members and the school officials tried to appease each other. In July 1968, the newly appointed Dayton school superintendent paid his first visit to a meeting of the Model Cities Planning Council. He praised the program as “a unique opportunity for achievement in the inner city” (Dansker, 1968). The education consultant to Model Cities tried to help the public schools. In December 1968, the School Board asked the voters to approve a school tax levy. The Model Cities consultant suggested using some Model Cities program money to help the schools in the entire city (Model Cities Levy Linked, 1968).

At the November 1968 meeting, Dayton’s Board of Education declared its desire to actively participate in the Model Cities program. Although this was only tentative approval, it was essential in order for Model Cities to receive federal support. Unfortunately, it was not clear who would control the schools in the Model Cities area. In 1968, the Board of Education approved the formation of community school councils. In each school building, the council included six parents elected from the area, the principal, the community school director, representatives from the teachers’ organizations, and, in the high schools, a member of the student council. The purpose of these community school councils was to encourage citizen participation in school affairs (Projects Listed, 1968). On the other hand, the Model Cities people expected these councils do more than encourage citizen participation. They wanted these school councils to have final authority over whatever happened in those schools.

The 1969 Comprehensive Model Cities Plan said that the community school councils had to have authority if the schools were to serve the children in the neighborhood. The 1969 application made a significant change over the initial application submitted in 1967 by SCOUR. The premise of the SCOUR’s 1967 application was that there was something wrong with the homes and the neighborhoods in which the children lived. Thus, they proposed that compensatory education services should extend from preschool through upper secondary level. These services were to make up for non-supportive homes, deprived environments, and prevailing disinterest in school success. In contrast, the 1969 Model Cities comprehensive plan said the basic cause of the problems found in the inner West area was discrimination expressed in four ways. First, the residents were excluded from policy making or administrative decisions. Second, the services delivered to the area were inadequate. Third, individuals were prevented from using supposedly available services. Fourth, the residents had few choices in employment or housing. To prove the pervasiveness of discrimination,
they said "the Dayton Board of Education divides the money within its budget into equal portions for school districts throughout the city. This appears to be fair... . Except, the children in Model Cities Neighborhood schools have a wide variety of special needs and problems... . An equal portion is not enough to enable these children to achieve at the same level as students from other homes" (City of Dayton, 1969).

First, the 1969 plan asserted that the seven members of the Dayton Board of Education School Board did not represent individuals living in the Model Cities. The Planning Council did conclude that "community involvement and the exchange of ideas between the community and the School Board, which they said "the Dayton Board of Education divides the money within its budget into equal portions for school districts throughout the city. This appears to be fair... . Except, the children in Model Cities Neighborhood schools have a wide variety of special needs and problems... . An equal portion is not enough to enable these children to achieve at the same level as students from other homes" (City of Dayton, 1969). Second, evidence of inadequate services was found in the low achievement of students and ethnic sensitivity programs into the schools. The Planning Council may have ignored these improvements because it wanted to justify taking control of the schools in the Model Cities area. They wanted to control the finances; they also wanted the power to select staff, principals, and teachers for the schools.

The Planning Council moved to take this control. In April 1969, the chairperson of the Model Cities Planning Council said that the purpose of the elected councils should be to set policy for the schools. He added that the educational technicians would carry it out (Harris, 1969a). Consequently, the Planning Council set up programs to prepare residents to serve on the community school councils. In June 1969, the project director of the educational component reported success in teaching residents "to participate fully in the development of new educational programs for the entire community." The residents who took part in this program learned to make decisions about site selection of schools, design of schools, purchase of materials, and designing curriculum. According to the report, the participants viewed the program as one that was moving toward positive school reform (Thomas, 1969).

Planning Council wanted a young African American man, then an assistant principal in a Dayton school, to be the director. The Board was unwilling to name him, although they agreed to do so on June 10, 1969 (Harris, 1969b). In July 1969, the School Board reversed a decision the director made about job announcements for positions in the Model Cities education staff (Allbaugh, 1969). The Model Cities education director fought the Board saying that the School Board should not control the project. He said the City Demonstration Agency controlled Model Cities since the federal money went to this group; the City Commissioner and the Superintendent of Dayton schools disagreed. Although he lost that battle, the Education Director publicly accused the Superintendent and the Dayton School Board of trying to destroy Model Cities (Felton, 1969). After nearly eight months of rancor, the Board agreed that all proposals affecting schools in the target area would be agreeable to the Model Cities Planning Council (Worth 1969). Two months later, the Board fired the Education Director of Model Cities because he had interfered at a riot at Stivers High School. When the School Board ignored the protests of the Planning Council, the Planning Council sued in common pleas court. They complained that the Board of Education had violated the agreement to share decision making with the Planning Council. In November 1969, the judge ruled that the Board could not enter an agreement to share the power to select personnel; the School Board could not abdicate the responsibility to hire, retain, or dismiss staff. In January 1970, the Planning Council returned to court and contended that federal program guidelines stipulated that the Board of Education and the Planning Council share power. The judge said that federal guidelines could not force people to enter illegal agreements (Ruling Backs School, 1970).

This personnel issue did not alter the programs offered in the area schools for two reasons. First, despite being fired by the Board of Education, the former director was hired by the Model Cities Planning Council as a consultant ("Thomas to Draw Pay," 1970). Furthermore, the compensatory educational programs continued in the Model Cities neighborhood despite the controversy.

In 1970, of all the aspects of Model Cities in inner West, the biggest share of the total $2,949,000 budget went into the education component. It used $555,000. Job development was second with a total of $512,000. The money for education was spent on several projects. For example, the community schools program kept five schools open from seven in the morning until ten at night. During this time, the buildings held adult education classes, set up recreational activities in the gyms, and allowed residents to offer personal services to other people in the neighborhood. This program served over 1,000 people. Since residents of the area taught in the programs, the community schools employed and trained people who might not have had jobs.

The education component tried to change the personnel in the schools through two programs. First, the administrative interns program sought to train people to become change agents in inner city schools. The interns took sensitivity training and they studied the perceptions of neighbor-
board residents. Second, the education component of Model Cities restrained teachers. Teachers learned to develop innovative teaching techniques and team teaching. In the first year, these inferences focused on Black awareness.

Finally, there were several programs for the students. For example, programs of guidance and counseling prevented children in the upper elementary grades from developing negative attitudes. The education component invited prominent Black Americans to visit the schools to inspire the children to succeed. Some of these programs were from other agencies, such as Head Start that enrolled almost fifteen hundred children and employed 164 people to develop perceptual, social, and verbal skills in the children (City of Dayton, 1970). Most of these programs were successful. The students in the summer youth tutoring program gained from six months to two years reading ability because of sixty hours of instruction. Between 1969 and 1971, eighteen interns received master's degrees in administration with special emphasis on middle-city schools (Tyson, 1973). The administrative interns were constantly on the job. They set up student council courts to help the students handle the discipline problems themselves. The interns arranged for municipal court judges to visit the schools and officiate at mock trials to show how the criminal justice system worked. Through the student council courts, the children in the school took a share in building management, and they learned important lessons in civics. The interns made home visits to try to help children who were having trouble, and they conducted inferences to help teachers realize the problems the children faced at home. Because of this work, school attendance rates improved and discipline problems declined. Further, Model Cities contracted a branch of the Kettering Foundation, IDEA, to teach teachers and administrators how to introduce individually guided instruction into the schools (Revere, 1994).

These activities increased to the point that in 1974, the education component secured more funds in partnership with other agencies than any other aspect of Model Cities. These partnership monies created opportunities for middle-school children with reading problems to teach reading to primary school children. Other partnerships included a program that recruited students from nearby colleges to serve as teachers' aides. Furthermore, a local historically Black state university opened a branch campus in the designated project area (Martinlade, 1974).

Model Cities and School Segregation

The Model Cities programs reinforced the racial segregation of the public schools in three ways. First, the basis of the compensatory programs was that the children in the inner West faced special problems. Therefore, they should be kept apart. One example is illustrative. In 1969, the U.S. Department of Health Education and Welfare pressured the School Board to racially desegregate the faculty. In May, the Model Cities Planning Council sent a letter to the School Board saying there had been a "concentrated effort on behalf of the coordinator to orientate and further sensitize teachers to the neighborhoods' educational problems. It is important that the present teachers be allowed to stay in their positions if they so desire" ("Model Cities Council," 1969). Consequently, in the eyes of the Planning Council, the special training of the teachers outweighed the benefits of a desegregated faculty.

Second, the Model Cities program reinforced racial segregation in schools by trying to defeat the liberal members of the School Board who were working to racially desegregate the schools. Until 1972, Board members who called themselves liberal held most of the seven seats on the Board of Education. When the Board fired the Model Cities education director in 1969, a member of the Model Cities Planning Council joined a newly formed conservative Serving Our Schools party. Supported strongly by White people on the east side of Dayton, SOS members favored retaining neighborhood schools. As a result, they favored firing the superintendent who had integrated the faculty in the schools and was moving toward integrating the students (Albaugh, 1973). The Planning Council tried to show the liberal Board that the ideas of the conservative School Board party were reasonable. In February 1970, the chairperson of the Model Cities education sub-committee announced the formation of an alliance for quality. This new group asked two representatives from each of Dayton's ten high schools to compile a report. Their aim was to show the School Board that the school's quality was more important than racial balance among its students. The chairperson's rationale was that if all schools were of high quality, "the Black child will have no difficulty being accepted in the White school and vice versa" (Albaugh, 1970).

Most important, the Model Cities antagonism against the School Board seemed to tip a crucial election in favor of the conservative party "Serving Our Schools." In 1969, three conservative members of the SOS party won election to the school Board. Drawing unprecedented publicity to school affairs, they resisted the efforts of the liberal majority to voluntarily desegregate the schools. In November 1971, a fourth SOS won a seat on the Board. In December 1971, before the conservatives took control, the liberal Board members passed three resolutions. One was an admission of responsibility for causing segregation in the schools. Another asked the State Department of education to form a metropolitan school district to force suburban children to attend city schools. The last was to order the desegregation of Dayton's schools. When they took office in January 1972, the newly elected conservative SOS majority rescinded those resolutions. The NAACP sued in U.S. District Court three months later. As a result, the 1973 election was an important election. If the liberals could win a majority, they would end the extensive legal resistance to desegregation the conservative SOS party caused.

In 1973, liberals organized into a School Board party called Citizens for Better Schools. They had a chance to unseat the conservatives who had taken control of the School Board in 1972 because four of the seven seats were open for election. Liberals already controlled two of the seats that
were not open for election. CBS members collected money, selected candidates, and planned a campaign. While one member of the CBS party won a seat, the candidate for the crucial second seat lost by seven votes with a total of 18,171. The election results showed that African Americans in West Dayton had helped defeat her. Before the election, activists whom newspaper reporters called “Black separatists” said that integration was not a primary concern for African Americans; they complained that desegregation would make Black children a minority in all buildings (Hamm, 1972).

Perhaps because of these arguments, voters from the predominantly Black West Dayton did not support the liberals as the CBS leaders had expected. One CBS candidate in 1973 was Reverend U.A. Hughey, a former officer in the NAACP. Although he was the only African American running for the School Board, he polled only 6,018 votes from West Dayton. This was 5,500 more votes than the strongest candidate from the pre­dominant Black voters held a concern for the liberal views on the School Board. In the same election, a liberal Black man, James McGee, who ran for reelection for mayor, received 8,690 votes from West Dayton. This means that more than two thousand voters from West Dayton supported the liberal mayor but refused to cast a vote for a liberal School Board candidate (Schumacher, 1973).

Finally, Model Cities encouraged racial segregation in a controversy about the relocation of a school. In Spring 1967, a fire partially destroyed Edison Elementary School located in the Model Cities target area. During Summer 1968, members of the Planning Council and the Education Director of Model Cities wanted to rebuild Edison School on its original site and improved. Their view was that if the school was an excellent one, White children would ask to come to Edison. Hughey wanted Edison School to be relocated closer to White neighborhoods. Hughey’s view was the school would promote integration by its location. Hughey lost that debate; the School Board rebuilt Edison on its original site (Goodman, 1968c).

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Conclusion

In 1971, President Richard Nixon announced that Dayton was one of the twenty cities to participate in an innovation called Planned Variations of the Model Cities Programs. This meant that Model Cities would expand to cover all parts of the city. The Model Cities Demonstration Project on the West side remained apart, however, and its Planning Council continued to control its affairs much more than citizens’ groups in other areas could. Unfortunately, pressure built in the U.S. Congress to remove Model Cities programs. By February 1974, there were three bills in congress that sought to consolidate the Model Cities monies into block grants. In 1973, the population had declined. Jobs are rare. Population has declined. In 1994, the population of the inner West area, formerly the target area of the Model Cities Demonstration project, was 11,420. This represents a decline of 73% in less than thirty years. When the Model Cities demonstration project began, 42,000 people lived in the target area. Model Cities did not transform this slum. Most residents abandoned it.

The same is true of the West side of Dayton. Housing is demolished. Jobs are rare. Population has declined. In 1994, the population of the inner West area, formerly the target area of the Model Cities Demonstration project, was 11,420. This represents a decline of 73% in less than thirty years. When the Model Cities demonstration project began, 42,000 people lived in the target area. Model Cities did not transform this slum. Most residents abandoned it.

Nonetheless, many groups look back to the Model Cities experience and find important and valuable lessons. Administrators in the City of Dayton acknowledge that Model Cities was an important project that encouraged residents to decide what will happen in their neighborhoods. It led to the program. In response, the City of Dayton produced a forty-page progress report and accompanying slide presentation celebrating the success of the demonstration project on the West side. Unfortunately, the publicity did not influence enough congressional votes. On August 30 1975, all of Dayton’s Model Cities projects ended.

Dayton’s Model Cities demonstration project on the West side of Dayton had left economic problems in its wake. The city was forced to pay back huge sums of money to the federal government that the Model Cities demonstration project had misspent. As a result, the city administration refused to give any citizen’s group the financial control that the Model Cities Planning Council enjoyed (Woodie, 1994). The effort to racially desegregate Dayton’s public schools was more successful. In September 1976, Dayton began a first program of cross-district busing for racial balance in Ohio. Newspapers such as the New York Times praised it as the most successful up to that time.

Most important, neither Model Cities nor the court ordered desegregation of public schools reduced racial segregation. The number of children in the Dayton schools has steadily declined and the percentage of the students in the Dayton schools who are African Americans has steadily increased. As in the 1960s, school segregation reflects housing segregation. In 1980, only 13.5% of the households in Montgomery County, in which Dayton lies, live in integrated census tracts (Montgomery County Fair Housing Board, 1985). This is such a severe rate of segregation that in 1988 a researcher found the housing patterns in the Dayton Metropolitan area to be the third-most segregated among fifty-nine other cities. Only Cleveland and Chicago were worse (Scipio, 1988).

In 1978, national columnist William Raspberry tried to assess the value of Model Cities to Atlanta, Georgia. He noted that the population had declined. Buildings were demolished. The percentage of families on public assistance had increased. Students in the area schools did badly when compared to students in other parts of the city. Raspberry said that these statistics do not prove that the project was a failure. He said that the project had allowed people to move out of the area. While President Johnson had promised that Model Cities would transform the slum, Raspberry was content that Model Cities had helped people leave.

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priority Board system that determines what projects go on in the city. Teachers say they learned that school people can join with parents and community members to make improvements in schools. An active system of community education councils work within the Dayton Public Schools. Furthermore, the administrative intern program from Model Cities schools trained many African American women who occupy important positions in school systems and in regional government. Some religious leaders say they learned to work effectively to overturn the effects of White racism (Davis, 1990).

These may appear to be minor benefits for a program that consumed a great deal of money, time, and human energy. However, the people involved thought that the benefits were extensive. Most important, these benefits imply that the empowerment of African Americans will break down the effects of racism. Unfortunately, in Dayton, the arguments of resident control of Model Cities seemed to reinforce the power of a small elite more than it encouraged genuine democracy. Perhaps widespread popular participation would have come in time. Dayton's Model Cities Demonstration Project lasted seven years before national leadership abolished the program. This may have been too short a period for participation to spread. Consequently, it is difficult to draw firm conclusions. Racially segregated programs could reduce the effects of racism and enhance democracy. Dayton's Model Cities Demonstration Project did not.

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