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# To Protect and Collect: A Nationwide Study of Profit-motivated Police Crime

Philip M. Stinson

*Bowling Green State University*, [stinspm@bgsu.edu](mailto:stinspm@bgsu.edu)

John Liederbach

*Bowling Green State University*, [jlieder@bgsu.edu](mailto:jlieder@bgsu.edu)

Michael Buerger

*Bowling Green State University*, [mbuerge@bgsu.edu](mailto:mbuerge@bgsu.edu)

Steven L. Brewer

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## PROFIT-MOTIVATED POLICE CRIME

### **To Protect and Collect: A Nationwide Study of Profit-Motivated Police Crime**

#### **Abstract**

This study is part of a larger research project on police crime in the United States. Police crimes are those criminal offenses committed by sworn law enforcement officers who have the general powers of arrest. Profit-motivated police crime involves officers who use their authority of position to engage in crime for personal gain. This study reports the findings on 1,591 cases where a law enforcement officer was arrested for one or more profit-motivated crimes during the seven-year period 2005-2011. The profit-motivated arrest cases involved 1,396 individual officers employed by 782 state, local, special, constable, and tribal law enforcement agencies located in 531 counties and independent cities in 47 states and the District of Columbia. Our data is the first systematic study of profit-motivated police crime. The study describes the nature of this form of police misconduct in terms of several dimensions, including the characteristics of police who perpetrate these crimes, where it occurs, the specific criminal charges, and the contexts within which profit-motivated police crime is punished through police agencies and the criminal courts.

*Keywords:* police crime, police corruption, police misconduct, profit-motivated police crime

**To Protect and Collect: A Nationwide Study of Profit-Motivated Police Crime**

American policing seems to confront an inflection point both historically and within the present context of crisis. A series of notorious police-citizen encounters have stoked anti-police sentiment and undermined police legitimacy in some communities: Ferguson (MO) and the shooting of Michael Brown; Baltimore (MD) and the in-custody death of Freddie Gray; Chicago (IL) and the shooting of LaQuan McDonald. Whether one views these cases as legitimate or excessive, the resulting protests and civil unrest demonstrate tenuous police-community relations and eroded public confidence in police (Liederbach, 2016). The current crisis provides an obvious context for any contemporary empirical study on police misconduct, corruption, and/or crime, particularly those that present new data. Unlike the high-profile cases above, most instances of police misconduct never come to the attention of the public or prosecutors, and there are no comprehensive statistics on the nature and prevalence of these phenomena. The mending of fences between police and community depends to a large degree on empirical data that describes various forms of police misconduct and parallel efforts to utilize the data as an avenue towards increased transparency, accountability, and ultimately the improvement of policing.

One complicating factor in the study of police misconduct relates to variety and the range of acts that have been loosely defined under this rubric. Police misconduct arises from an assortment of motivations, with considerable variation within each type or category. Many but not all forms involve abuse of police authority, though it is important to bear in mind the distinction between crimes facilitated or abetted by that authority, and crimes committed under circumstances where the police authority is irrelevant. For the former, there is a basic division anchored in the officer's motivation.

The first motivation has been termed “noble cause corruption” in which bad things are done to advance good ends (Caldero & Crank, 2004). Perjury and “testilying” to obtain the conviction of criminal defendants is one example (Dershowitz, 1994a, 1994b). Conducting warrantless searches to confiscate and destroy drugs or weapons from known criminals (when legal grounds to do so are not available) is another form, ostensibly justified by “protection of the community.” These examples involve the application of police authority outside the formal rules, but for the presumed benefit of society rather than for the individual officers.

The second motivation involves some kind of personal gain, whether it be personal gratification that is solely psychological, or criminal procurement of financial gain. Psychological benefits may be sexual gratification (e.g., strip-searching citizens without justification), and may range as far as sadism. Other forms of this type of misconduct may involve an assertion of racist, homophobic, or other social views, denigrating or humiliating individuals without legal justification. In such cases, the police authority serves as the backdrop to the imposition of a personally-held, illegitimate “moral” order not recognized by the law or society.

This paper addresses an element of the second motivation, the use of police authority for personal enrichment. Fyfe and Kane (2006) coined the term "profit-motivated" police misconduct to describe a variety of corrupt and/or illegal "money-making" behaviors that had connections of varying strength to the perpetrator's employment as a police officer (p. xiv). Historically, financial corruption was institutional rather than individual, as the history of “The Pad” in New York City demonstrates (see, e.g., Knapp Commission, 1972). The line between pro-social and personal motives is readily permeable as illegal activities to undermine a drug mob can quickly morph into for-profit criminal activities on the “Prince of the City” model (see

Daley, 1978). News media accounts of police officers arrested for profit-motivated crimes more specifically demonstrate the substance of our research: police arrested for embezzlement to support a gambling addiction, or the acceptance of bribes in exchange for political favors (see, e.g., Associated Press, 2006a; Parrish, 2007); police arrested for theft of illegal drugs, or participation in large-scale trafficking operations (see, e.g., Associated Press, 2006b; The Seattle Times, 2009); police arrested for repeated burglaries of homes and commercial business; and, police arrested for robberies and the shakedown of drug dealers involving hundreds of pounds of marijuana and dozens of kilos of cocaine (see, e.g., Glover, 2008; Lakin, 2007). Some accounts of profit-motivated police crime seem more far-fetched, such as cases where police were arrested for stealing from accounts designated for the DARE program or a "kids and cops" Christmas fund (see, e.g., Colquhoun, 2006; The State Journal-Register, 2013). These cases are *not* morally ambiguous, nor do they involve policies and/or officers that merely push ethical boundaries. These are police who were arrested based on probable cause that they had engaged in illegal money-making criminal offenses for personal profit.

The current study extends the existing and considerable line of research regarding various forms of police misconduct by focusing on particular forms of profit-motivated police crimes. More specifically, the data describe the nature of profit-motivated police crime in terms of who commits it, where it occurs, and the criminal offenses charged in these types of cases. The study also describes how this sort of police misconduct is recognized and punished (or not) by police organizations and criminal courts. These data are important because they augment existing studies on the topic. This is the only study known to systematically describe a large sample of profit-motivated police crimes as they occur within state and local law enforcement agencies across the United States. The next section provides a review of the relevant scholarship. The

review locates the perpetration of profit-motivated police crime within historical and occupational contexts, and describes the few empirical studies in which these sorts of police behaviors have been conceptualized and previously identified and studied.

### **Profit-Motivated Police Crime: Conceptualization & Data**

Much of the crime committed by police officers historically has been viewed in the context of corruption. The Knapp Commission (1972) identified bad cops in New York City as “grass eaters” who engaged in petty acts of corruption, and “meat eaters” who were deeply involved in organized police corruption. The Mollen Commission (1994) found that greed is the primary motive behind police crime that constitutes corruption. This is true if police corruption is conceptualized in the traditional context of acts such as accepting bribes to refrain from law enforcement. It is, however, “less clear whether officers who perform robberies or burglaries, shoplift, sell drugs, or engage in welfare or insurance fraud during their off-duty time are engaging in a variety of police corruption” (Fyfe & Kane, 2006, p. xv). Fyfe and Kane (2006) re-conceptualized these actions as “profit-motivated” misconduct and noted that “police corruption is not as easy to define as we formerly may have believed” (p. xv). Similarly, Carter (1990, pp. 89–90) conceptualized police corruption as being characterized by a “profit-driven cycle.” The classification of some police crime as profit-motivated is also found in Ross’ (2001) taxonomy of police crime, where the second of four dichotomous distinctions is between “economically-motivated and non-economically-motivated police behavior” (p. 184).

Theories on the subculture of police deviance can be used to explain the occurrence of profit-motivated police crime. Subculture theories provide rationale and attempt to explain factors that might prompt some police officers to commit a crime, including those of the money-making variety. Westley (1956) and Stoddard (1968) posited that there is an informal code in

policing that dictates how most sworn law enforcement officers behave in their dealings with each other. This is consistent with Vollmer's observation that in many police departments it is an unwritten rule that officers never testify against another officer (Wickersham Commission, 1931). Key (1935) noted that police graft in the 1930s was facilitated by a rule of silence among police officers. Similarly, Westley's (1956, 1970) research in the 1950s found that a code of secrecy existed in police departments that was used to shield against outsiders, creating an "us versus them" mentality for most police officers. Building on the concept of an informal social code within policing, Stoddard (1968) hypothesized that police recruits are socialized into an informal but unlawful code of secrecy that perpetuates as a process of group deviation into illegal behaviors. Stoddard called this process blue-coat crime, which he defined as a "functioning informal social system whose norms and practices are at variance with legal statutes" commonly referred to by police officers simply as "the code" (Stoddard, 1968, p. 201). Stoddard listed a variety of practices under the code that are crimes, including shopping (i.e., stealing from businesses after hours), extortion, bribery, shakedown, perjury, and premeditated theft. Thus, theories on police subculture explain how officers and law enforcement organizations collectively fail to provide formal and informal controls to mitigate money-making misconduct.

The occupational environment of police work can be used to explain the occurrence of profit-motivated police crime beyond collective secrecy and deviant subcultural norms. Instances of police misconduct have been traditionally described as "hidden" behaviors that are likely to go unreported; and hence, difficult to identify and mitigate. Police scholars often underscore how opportunities for corruption, misconduct, and crime derive directly from the law enforcement work environment (see, e.g., Goldstein, 1977; Kappeler, Sluder, & Alpert, 1998).

These opportunities abound within the context of police work. Police commonly patrol alone and largely free from any direct supervision. Police-citizen interactions often occur in the late-night hours that provide low public visibility. Police often encounter citizens who are themselves law-breakers, vulnerable, and/or commonly assumed to be not credible as potential complainants. These realities show how it is possible for deviant police officers to engage in illegal money-making activities including the shakedown of drug dealers, thefts from homes and businesses known to lack capable guardianship, or the embezzlement of funds from accounts wherein police officers act as fiduciaries because they are generally presumed to be trustworthy.

A small number of empirical studies provide data on the profit-motivated deviance and crimes perpetrated by police. Kane and White (2013) explored the nature of the career-ending police misconduct in the NYPD and found that the profit-motivated cases ( $N = 387$ ) included bribe-taking (18.6%), grand larceny (17.1%), insurance fraud (8.6%), burglary (7.3%), petit larceny (7.3%), receiving stolen property (3.9%), government fraud (3.1%), gratuities (2.6%), gambling (1.8%), illegal operation (1.8%), and other profit-motivated misconduct (27.4%) such as extortion, robbery, or abusing official resources (p. 73, Table 4.2).

More recently, Stinson and colleagues found that profit-motivated police crime is a quantifiable variable that helps explain the nature of police crime across the life course of officers' law enforcement careers in a variety of contexts at nonfederal law enforcement agencies throughout the United States. Whereas less experienced police officers are more likely to commit violent crimes, those officers who commit profit-motivated crimes are more likely to be experienced officers late in their policing career and more likely to be supervisors and/or administrators (Stinson, Liederbach, & Freiburger, 2010). Likewise, crime by policewomen is most often profit-motivated (Stinson, Todak, & Dodge, 2015). Crime by school resource



officers typically is *not* profit-motivated police crime (Stinson & Watkins, 2014). Profit-motivated police crimes are more likely to be committed while officers are on-duty and less likely to be committed while an officer is off-duty (Stinson, Liederbach, & Freiburger, 2012).

The current study identifies, describes, and analyzes almost 1,600 actual cases where sworn law enforcement officers from nonfederal agencies across the United States were arrested for one or more profit-motivated police crimes. The purpose of this paper is to provide an overview of profit-motivated police crime arrests and to determine predictors of an officer being convicted in one of these cases. The next section provides an overview of the methodology employed in this quantitative content analysis research study.

### **Method**

This study is part of a larger research project on police crime designed to locate cases in which nonfederal sworn law enforcement officers were arrested for any type of crime(s). Police crimes are those criminal offenses committed by sworn law enforcement officers who have the general powers of arrest. Data were culled from news articles published on the internet using the Google News search engine and the automated Google Alerts email update service. Google Alerts searches were set up using the 48 search terms developed by Stinson (2009). The Google Alerts email update service constantly crawled the Google News search engine on each of the 48 search terms. An email message was sent each time one of the automated daily searches of the Google News search engine identified a news article that matched any of the search terms. The email alerts contained a link to the uniform resource locator (URL) for the identified new articles. The news articles were located, examined for relevancy, printed, logged, and then scanned into digital images, indexed, and archived in an object-relational project database for subsequent coding and content analysis. Whenever possible, additional news articles and court

records were subsequently located by research assistants and added to the database. This study focused on the identification, description, and analysis of the cases in which sworn law enforcement officers were arrested for one or more profit-motivated crimes during the calendar years 2005-2011. Profit-motivated police crime involves sworn officers who use the authority of their position to engage in crime for personal economic gain.

### **Coding and Content Analysis**

Content analyses were conducted in order to code the cases in terms of (a) arrested officer, (b) employing agency, (c) charged criminal offense(s), (d) victim characteristics, (e) type of police crime, (f) adverse employment outcomes, and (g) criminal case dispositions. The data collection guidelines of the National Incident-Based Reporting System (NIBRS) was used as the coding protocol for each criminal offense (see U.S. Department of Justice, 2000). Fifty-seven criminal offenses are included in the NIBRS, consisting of 46 incident-based criminal offenses in one of 22 crime categories, as well as 11 additional arrest-based minor criminal offense categories. An additional eight offenses were added following an earlier pilot study (see Stinson, 2009) because police officers who were arrested often were charged with criminal offenses not included in the NIBRS (e.g., online solicitation of a child, indecent exposure, official misconduct / official oppression / violation of oath, vehicular hit-and-run, perjury / false reports / false statements, criminal deprivation of civil rights). In each case *every offense charged* was recorded on the coding instrument as well as the *most serious offense charged* in each police crime arrest case. The most serious offense charged was determined using the Uniform Crime Report's (UCR) crime seriousness hierarchy (see U.S. Department of Justice, 2004).

The primary unit of analysis in this study was criminal arrest case. This provided the opportunity to differentiate between officers' crimes with multiple victims and officers who were

arrested on multiple occasions within the study years 2005-2011. By coding each arrest case separately, the criminal case dispositions in each case as well as the adverse employment actions attached to each arrest case could be documented for analysis. Cases were also coded on Stinson's (2009, 2015) typology of police crime, which posits that most crime committed by police officers is alcohol-related, drug-related, sex-related, violence-related, and/or profit-motivated. These types of police crime are not mutually-exclusive categories, and so each type of police crime was coded as a dichotomous variable because crimes committed by officers often involve more than one type of police crime. Cases were also coded on numerous variables relating to drug-related police crimes and drugs of abuse (see Stinson et al., 2013).

Secondary data were employed from the Census of State and Local Law Enforcement Agencies (CSLLEA) (U.S. Department of Justice, 2008) to ascertain demographic data including the number of full-time sworn personnel and part-time sworn personnel employed by each agency where arrested officers served. Fifteen agencies included in this study were not listed in the 2008 wave of the CSLLEA. County and independent city five-digit Federal Information Processing Standards (FIPS) identifier numbers (see U.S. Census Bureau, 2010) were used to verify location of arrested officers' employing law enforcement agencies, as well as for use as a key variable to merge other data sources into the project's master database and data set. The U.S. Department of Agriculture's (2003) county-level urban to rural nine-point continuum scale was used to measure rurality with population data from the U.S. Census Bureau's decennial census in year 2000 for county, independent city, and state populations.

### **Reliability**

Analytic procedures were undertaken to ensure reliability of the data. An additional coder was employed to independently code a random sample of five percent of the total number

of cases in the larger study. Intercoder reliability was assessed by calculating the Krippendorff's alpha coefficient across 195 variables of interest in this study on a random sample ( $n = 290$ , 4.3%) of the cases in the study ( $N = 6,724$ ) (see Hayes & Krippendorff, 2007). Krippendorff's alpha is often recognized as the standard reliability statistic for content analysis research (Riffe, Lacy, & Fico, 2005). The Krippendorff's alpha coefficient (Krippendorff's  $\alpha = .9153$ ) is strong across the variables in this study, indicating a high level of intercoder reliability (see Krippendorff, 2013).

### **Statistical Analysis**

Chi Square was used to measure the statistical significance of the association between two variables measured at the nominal level. Cramer's  $V$  measured the strength of that relationship with values that range from zero to 1.0 and allows for an "assessment of the actual importance of the relationship" (Riffe et al., 2005, p. 191). Stepwise binary logistic regression was used to determine which of the predictor variables were statistically significant in multivariate models. Stepwise logistic regression models are appropriate where the study is purely exploratory and predictive (Menard, 2002). This is an exploratory study because little is known empirically about profit-motivated crimes committed by sworn officers at nonfederal law enforcement agencies across the United States. Summary statistics are also reported for evaluation of regression diagnostics and each regression model.

This study utilized the Classification and Regression Trees (CART) decision tree predictive analytic algorithm as a statistical technique to uncover the causal pathways between independent predictors of officers arrested for one or more profit-motivated crimes and conviction on any criminal offense charged. Although there are other predictive modeling algorithms, we used CART because it fit our problem and produced an optimal decision tree by

minimizing the generalization error (see, e.g., Rokach & Maimon, 2005, p. 167). CART is a classification procedure that produces a binary decision tree and restricts partitioning at each node to two nodes, thus producing binary splits for each child node (Dension, Mallick, & Smith, 1998). A node represents points at which the algorithm has to make a choice of possible alternatives. A decision is made at each node, thus creating a child node or a terminal node. A child node is the result of the algorithm splitting the data into subgroups whereas a terminal node is finalized and no longer partitioned. The process is applied recursively until the tree is completed. Breiman, Friedman, Olshen, and Stone's (1984) CART algorithm uses an extensive and exhaustive search of all possible univariate splits to determine the splitting of the data for the classification tree. Partitioning will continue until the algorithm is unable to produce mutually exclusive and homogenous groups (De'ath & Fabricius, 2000; Dension et al., 1998). After creating an exhaustive tree, CART will prune nodes that do not significantly contribute to overall prediction.

The predictive power of logistic regression and classification tree models was assessed through the Area Under the Curve (AUC) component of the Receiver Operating Characteristic (ROC). The AUC assesses the predictive accuracy of a statistical model and serves as the preferred method for assessing and comparing models (Bewick, Cheek, & Ball, 2004; Dolan & Doyle, 2000). The ROC curve considers the sensitivity versus 1- specificity, a representation of the true positive rate (TPR) versus the false positive rate (FPR). The curve is displayed graphically by plotting the TFP on the y-axis and the FPR on the x-axis. ROC curves are interpreted through the AUC, a score that ranges from zero to one. A straight line through a ROC curve is the equivalent of 0.5 and suggests that the model is no better at prediction than flipping a coin. A score of one indicates that the model is able to accurately predict all cases.

The AUC is interpreted as a proportional reduction of error (PRE) measure of explained variation by calculating  $R_{ROC}^2 = 2(AUC - .5)$  (Menard, 2010).

### **Strengths and Limitations**

The news search methodology utilizing the Google News search engine and the Google Alerts email update service provided an unparalleled amount of information on profit-motivated police crime across the United States. The Google News search engine algorithm offers some clear advantages over other aggregated news databases and the methodologies employed by previous studies. The Google Alerts email update service provides the ability to run persistent automated queries of the Google News search engine and deliver real-time search results. The Google News search engine draws content from more than 50,000 news sources (Bharat, 2012) and allows for access to a larger number of police misconduct cases than would be available through other methods (Payne, 2013).

There are four primary limitations of the data. First, the data were limited only to cases that involved an official arrest based on probable cause for one or more crimes. We do not report any data on the alleged criminal behavior of police who were not arrested. Second, our research was limited by the content and quality of information provided for each case. The amount of information available on each case varied, and data for several variables of interest were missing for some of the cases. Third, this research study included every case known to the research team of a nonfederal sworn law enforcement officer who was arrested during the years 2005-2011. Thus, we do not purport to include every single instance of a law enforcement officer being arrested for a profit-motivated crime. Finally, we recognize that these data were the result of a filtering process that includes the exercise of discretion by media sources in terms of both the types of stories covered and the nature of the content devoted to particular stories

(Carlson, 2007). Ready, White, and Fisher (2008), however, found that news coverage of officer misconduct is consistent with official police records of these events. Research also suggests that police agencies are not especially effective at controlling media accounts of officer misconduct (Chermak, McGarrell, & Gruenewald, 2006). Despite the noted limitations, the use of news articles as the primary data source is a long established method of analyzing police misconduct (see, e.g., Kraska & Kappeler, 1995; Lawrence, 2000; Lersch & Feagin, 1996; Rabe-Hemp & Braithwaite, 2013; Ross, 2000; Stinson et al., 2010).

### Results

There were 1,591 cases in the data set in which sworn nonfederal law enforcement officers were arrested for profit-motivated crimes during the period January 1, 2005, through December 31, 2011. The profit-motivated arrest cases involved 1,396 individual officers employed by 782 state, local, special, constable, and tribal law enforcement agencies located in 531 counties and independent cities in 47 states and the District of Columbia (all states except Idaho, Maine, and North Dakota). Of these 1,396 officers who were arrested for profit-motivated crimes, 94 of the arrested officers had more than one case ( $\bar{X} = 1.14$ ,  $Mdn = 1.00$ ,  $Mode = 1$ ,  $SD = .808$ ) because they had more than one crime victim (one criminal case per crime victim) and/or were arrested for a profit-motivated crime on more than one occasion during the study years 2005-2011. More than two-thirds of the profit-motivated criminal cases involved an arrested officer who is known to have lost his or her job ( $n = 1,080$ , 67.9%). The known final adverse employment outcomes in these cases include no action against the arrested officer ( $n = 135$ , 8.5%), suspended ( $n = 376$ , 23.6%), voluntarily resigned ( $n = 503$ , 31.6%), and involuntarily terminated ( $n = 577$ , 36.3%). More than half of the profit-motivated arrest cases resulted in a conviction ( $n = 914$ , 57.4%) on one or more offenses charged in the case.

### **Officers Arrested for Profit-motivated Police Crime, Offenses & Employing Agencies**

Table 1 presents descriptive information on the profit-motivated police crime arrest cases in terms of the arrested officer and the offenses charged, as well as information on the employing law enforcement agency and the arresting law enforcement agency. Most of the profit-motivated arrest cases involved male officers ( $n = 1,497$ , 94.1%). The modal category for known officer age at time of arrest was ages 36-39 ( $n = 244$ , 15.3%). The youngest officer arrested for a profit-motivated police crime was 20 years old at time of arrest, and the oldest was 79 years old ( $\bar{X}$  age = 38.01,  $Mdn$  age = 37.00, Mode age = 41,  $SD = 9.097$  years). The modal category for known years of service as a sworn law enforcement officer at time of arrest was 3-5 years ( $n = 197$ , 12.4%) ( $\bar{X}$  years of service = 10.90,  $Mdn$  years of service = 10.00, Mode years of service = 4,  $SD = 7.808$  years). More than one-fifth of the arrest cases ( $n = 234$ , 20.8%) where years of service at time of arrest was known involve an arrested officer with 18 or more years of service.

<<<< Insert Table 1 about here >>>>

Most of the profit-motivated police crime arrest cases involved sworn officers in patrol and street-level ranks, including nonsupervisory officers, deputies, troopers, and detectives ( $n = 1,243$ , 78.1%). Other profit-motivated police crime arrest cases included mid-rank line and field supervisors ( $n = 208$ , 13.1%) and high-ranking police managers and executives ( $n = 140$ , 8.8%). More than two-thirds of the profit-motivated arrest cases involved crimes that were committed while on-duty ( $n = 1,093$ , 68.7%). Even so, two-thirds of the cases ( $n = 1,081$ , 67.9%) involved an arrest made by some law enforcement agency other than the agency employing the arrested officer.

Some of the profit-motivated arrest cases also involved drug-related ( $n = 438$ , 27.5%), violence-related ( $n = 164$ , 10.3%), sex-related ( $n = 29$ , 1.8%), and/or alcohol-related ( $n = 16$ ,



1.0%) crimes. Many of the profit-motivated arrest cases involved crimes that were committed by sworn law enforcement officers acting in their official capacity ( $n = 1,141$ , 71.7%).

Most of the profit-motivated police crime arrest cases involved officers employed by municipal police departments ( $n = 1,162$ , 73.0%) or sheriff's offices ( $n = 251$ , 15.8%). The arrest cases also involved officers who were employed by primary state police agencies ( $n = 62$ , 3.9%), county police departments ( $n = 66$ , 4.2%), special police departments ( $n = 42$ , 2.6%), constable agencies ( $n = 7$ , 0.4%), and tribal police departments ( $n = 1$ , 0.1%). The modal category for size of the employing law enforcement agency by the number of full-time sworn officers employed was 1,000 or more full-time sworn officers ( $n = 495$ , 31.1%) and zero part-time sworn officers ( $n = 1,209$ , 76.1%). The majority of officers arrested in profit-motivated police crime arrest cases were employed by a nonfederal law enforcement agency located in a nonrural metropolitan county or independent city ( $n = 1,312$ , 82.5%). The employing agencies were located throughout the United States, including agencies in the Southern states ( $n = 726$ , 45.6%), Northeastern states ( $n = 362$ , 22.8%), Midwestern states ( $n = 329$ , 20.7%), and Western states ( $n = 174$ , 10.9%).

Table 2 presents the profit-motivated police crime arrest cases in terms of the most serious offense charged in each case. There were 46 separate criminal offense categories represented as the most serious offense charged in the profit-motivated police crime arrest cases in years 2005-2011. Most common as the most serious offense charged in the profit-motivated cases were unclassified thefts ( $n = 255$ , 16.0%), false pretenses (known as theft by deception in Model Penal Code states) ( $n = 199$ , 12.5%), drug offenses ( $n = 189$ , 11.9%), robbery ( $n = 103$ , 6.4%), thefts from buildings ( $n = 92$ , 5.8%), and extortion and blackmail ( $n = 85$ , 5.3%).

<<<<< Insert Table 2 about here >>>>>

### Victims of Profit-motivated Police Crime

Table 3 presents victim characteristics in profit-motivated police crime arrest cases in years 2005-2011. Victim information was not ascertainable from the source documents in many of the profit-motivated police crime arrest cases. Most of the known victims were male ( $n = 195$ , 83.3%, valid 73.3%). Almost none of the known victims were children under the age of 18 (valid 98.2% of the known victims were adults age 18 or older). Most of the known victims were strangers or nonstranger acquaintances ( $n = 350$ , 21.9%, valid 93.8 %) to the arrested officer. Very few of the victims were also police officers, although many of the cases involved internal crimes against the arrested officer's employing law enforcement agency ( $n = 738$ , 46.4%).

<<<<< Insert Table 3 about here >>>>>

### Predicting Conviction in Profit-motivated Police Crime Arrest Cases

The regression models predicted criminal conviction on any offense charged in profit-motivated police crime arrest cases versus non-conviction. Conviction data were available on over two-thirds of the profit-motivated cases ( $n = 1,105$ , 69.5%). Of those cases with known criminal case outcomes, most of the officers arrested for profit-motivated crimes were convicted ( $n = 914$ , valid 82.7%) on at least one offense charged in the case. Bivariate Chi-Square associations were statistically significant at the  $p < .05$  level for 49 independent variables and the dependent variables, *conviction on any offense charged*. There were six bivariate associations of moderate strength as indicated by the Cramer's  $V$  scores for the statistically significant Chi-Square statistics. The statistically significant bivariate associations of moderate strength were the victim's relationship to the arrested officer, where  $\chi^2 (6, N = 266) = 25.017, p < .001, V = .307$ ; age of the officer at time of arrest, where  $\chi^2 (49, N = 1,010) = 85.828, p = .001, V = .292$ ;

the State where the arrested officer's employing law enforcement agency was located, where  $\chi^2$  (47,  $N = 1,105$ ) = 88.251,  $p < .001$ ,  $V = .283$ ; years of service at time of arrest, where  $\chi^2$  (39,  $N = 799$ ) = 62.423,  $p = .010$ ,  $V = .280$ ; job loss, where  $\chi^2$  (1,  $N = 1,105$ ) = 82.094,  $p < .001$ ,  $V = .273$ ; and age as a categorical variable, where  $\chi^2$  (10,  $N = 1,105$ ) = 44.496,  $p < .001$ ,  $V = .201$ .

Table 4 presents a backward stepwise binary logistic regression model predicting conviction in profit-motivated police crime arrest cases. Bivariate correlations computed for each of the independent variables in the logistic regression model revealed that none of the variables were highly correlated with each other. Multicollinearity was not a problem as indicated by no tolerance scores below .696 and no variance inflation factors above 1.436. The Durbin-Watson score of 1.659 indicated that autocorrelation was not a problem in the model. Logistic regression results indicated that the overall model of nine predictors was statistically reliable in distinguishing between conviction and non-conviction in profit-motivated police crime arrest cases. The model correctly classified 83.8% of the cases (AUC = .593, 95% CI [.547, .639],  $R^2_{ROC} = .186$ ). Wald statistics indicated that all of the independent variables in the binary logistic regression model significantly predicted conviction in profit-motivated police crime arrest cases.

<<<<< Insert Table 4 about here >>>>>

Odds ratio interpretations provide context for prediction of criminal conviction in profit-motivated police crime arrest cases. The single largest predictor of conviction in the profit-motivated arrest cases was whether the officer's crime involved a drug-related shakedown. The simple odds of conviction were 109 times greater if the profit-motivated police crime involved a drug-related shakedown. Job loss also predicted conviction in profit-motivated police crime arrest cases. The simple odds of conviction in a profit-motivated case were 23.2 times greater if

the arrested officer ultimately lost their job (either through involuntary termination or through voluntary resignation) as the final adverse employment outcome following an officer's arrest for a profit-motivated police crime. Violence-related police crime also predicted criminal conviction in profit-motivated police crime arrest cases. The simple odds of conviction were 4.3 times higher if an officer's profit-motivated police crime was also violence-related. The type of nonfederal law enforcement agency employing the arrested officer and the state where the employing agency was located also predicted criminal conviction in profit-motivated police crime arrest cases. The simple odds of conviction in profit-motivated police crime arrest cases increased by 68% for every one-unit increase in agency type. Agency type was coded using several categories: (a) primary state police agency, (b) sheriff's office, (c) county police department, (d) municipal police department, (e) special police department, (f) constable agency, (g) tribal police department, and (h) regional police department. As a literal interpretation (remembering that this variable is a nominal-level measurement), that means as you move away from primary state police agencies to other types of police departments, the greater the likelihood of conviction. There is no practical interpretation of the odds ratio for the state where the officer's employing nonfederal law enforcement agency was located, other than to note that the simple odds of conviction in profit-motivated police crime arrest cases varied from state to state across the country.

Several variables in the logistic regression model predicted when criminal conviction (on any offense charged in the case against the arrested officer) was less likely. Here, the number of part-time sworn officers employed by the agency where the arrested officer worked predicted conviction. The simple odds of conviction went down by 27.2% for every one-unit categorical increase in the number of part-time sworn officers employed by the agency. The media and

public perception surrounding an officer's arrest for profit-motivated police crime also had an impact on conviction. The simple odds of conviction went down by 96.3% if the arrested officer's chief was under scrutiny as a result of the officer's arrest for a profit-motivated police crime. Although in the same model profit-motivated police crime arrest cases that involved a drug-related shakedown increased the simple odds of conviction, drug-related shakedowns in the form of off-duty robberies decreased the odds of conviction. The simple odds of conviction decreased by 98.9% if the officer's profit-motivated police crime arrest case involved a drug-related shakedown in the form of an off-duty robbery. Finally, the age of the victim in a profit-motivated police crime arrest case predicted the likelihood of conviction. The simple odds of conviction decreased by 30% for every one-unit categorical increase in the age of the victim in a profit-motivated police crime arrest case.

Figure 1 presents the CART results of predicting conviction for the profit-motivated cases and included a total of 1,105 police crime arrest cases. The tree had an overall classification score of 85.2% (AUC = .781, 95% CI [.744, .818],  $R_{ROC}^2 = .562$ ) and selected the variable *job loss* as the splitting criterion. Officers who had not lost their job (node 1) were convicted in 62.4% of the cases. In contrast, officers who lost their job (node 2) were convicted in 87.9% of the cases. The officers who had not lost their job in node 1 were partitioned by the variable *year of arrest*. Officers who were arrested in years 2005-2006 were convicted in 83.6% of the cases. Officers who were arrested in years 2007-2009 were convicted in 34.2% of the cases and officers who were arrested in years 2010- 2011 were convicted in 59.9% of the cases. The officers who had lost their job in node 2 were partitioned by the variable *urban/rural continuum*. Officers were convicted in 79.6% of the cases if employed by agencies located metropolitan counties or independent cities of 250,000 to 1 million; nonmetropolitan counties or

independent cities with an urban population of 20,000 or more, not adjacent to a metro area; counties or independent cities in a metropolitan area with a population of fewer than 250,00, adjacent to a metropolitan area; or nonmetropolitan counties or independent cities with an urban population of 20,000 or more, adjacent to a metropolitan area. Officers were convicted in 92.6% of the cases when employed by a law enforcement agency located in counties or independent cities within a metropolitan area of 1 million population or more; nonmetropolitan counties or independent cities with an urban population 2,500 to 19,999, adjacent to a metropolitan area; nonmetropolitan counties or independent cities with urban population of 2,500 to 19,999, not adjacent to a metropolitan area; nonmetropolitan counties or independent cities that were completely rural or less than 2,500 urban population, not adjacent to a metropolitan area; nonmetropolitan counties or independent cities that were completely rural or less than 2,500 urban population, adjacent to a metropolitan area. The tree also included the following variables in tier three: drug/narcotic violation, urban/rural continuum, arresting agency, and geographic region within the United States.

<<<<< Insert Figure 1 about here >>>>>

### **Discussion**

The current study identifies and analyzes almost 1,600 cases in which nonfederal sworn law enforcement officers across the United States were arrested for one or more profit-motivated crimes. The data describe how some officers use the power of their position to engage in personal enrichment or other forms of profit—a phenomenon captured within our title phrase as an obvious perversion of the well-recognized "protect and serve" motto. The study describes officers who perpetrate these crimes, the offenses charged in criminal court, and the conditions under which these behaviors are punished. Some points of discussion emerge from these data.

Perhaps the most obvious point of discussion concerns the widespread occurrence of these crimes. Long-standing scholarship focused exclusively on the profit-motivated crimes of police employed by large urban agencies, specifically those targeted by highly-publicized commissions created as a mechanism to reform "big-city" corruption. Our research identified police who committed profit-motivated crimes within the largest urban centers; but also, those employed within rural locales, small-towns, suburbs, and medium-sized cities. Almost one-fifth of these cases occurred in nonmetropolitan counties. We believe our data show that profit-motivated police crimes are not uncommon, and that existing assumptions about how rarely these offenses occur, and more specifically *where* they occur, need to be questioned. Profit-motivated police crime cannot be considered a problem exclusive to "big-city" police departments.

Our research also identified the types of criminal offenses that comprise profit-motivated police crime. This type of police crime most commonly involves some form of nonviolent theft. The most serious offense charged in roughly 40 percent of the cases was unclassified theft, false pretenses/swindle, theft from buildings, or embezzlement. Robbery was the most serious offense charged in only 6.4% of the cases, and only about one in ten of the total number of cases in the dataset were coded as "violence-related." Most would define the typical profit-motivated police crime as less serious, and perhaps not worthy of the attention-grabbing headlines commonly devoted to other forms of police misconduct involving police shootings, sexual violence, or other forms of assault.

Crimes of violence are logically defined as more serious than thefts and other property crimes, but perceptions that lead to the definition of profit-motivated police crimes as less serious run counter to traditional ideas about the importance of police integrity as a source of legitimacy. These are for the most part police officers who behaved as common thieves; they are

a disgrace to the badge. Misconceptions about the seriousness of profit-motivated crimes also threatens to undermine strategies to identify and punish officers who perpetrate them. For example, officers who perpetrated crimes in our study were arrested by police employed within an agency *other than* their own agency in over two-thirds of all the cases. The data do not specifically identify why the employing agency failed to arrest one of its own in the majority of cases. The finding does suggest that profit-motivated police crimes may not be a priority within many agencies, or perhaps that these types of crimes are intentionally ignored or commonly covered up within at least some agencies. The occurrence of these forms of police crime presumably weakens public confidence in law enforcement, a situation that potentially exacerbates conflicts recently sparked by more serious police shootings. Scholarship has demonstrated that levels of public confidence and support of police sometimes decline sharply in the aftermath of singular and notorious police-citizen encounters (see, e.g., Weitzer, 2002). The perpetration of less serious but more common money-making police crimes may quicken or exacerbate the demise of public confidence in the manner of the colloquial death by a thousand cuts.

Much of the analyses were dedicated to identifying the circumstances under which these sorts of crimes are punished. Our findings demonstrate that some forms of profit-motivated police crime are not likely to be tolerated by the criminal courts where juries (or judges in bench trials) assigned moral blameworthiness and overwhelmingly convicted officers charged with certain unseemly crimes, including profit-motivated crimes that involved some form of violence as well as on-duty police shakedowns of citizens involved in the drug trade. We also found that courts were more likely to convict an officer of a profit-motivated crime in cases where the officer had lost his or her job after being arrested. Prior research has shown that police officers



are likely to be convicted in cases where they lost their jobs after being charged with serious crimes involving acts of police sexual violence (Stinson, Brewer, Mathna, Liederbach, & Englebrecht, 2014). Officers are unlikely to be convicted or lose their job, however, when charged with less serious crimes such as drunk driving or incidents involving acts of officer-involved domestic violence (Stinson & Liederbach, 2013; Stinson, Liederbach, Brewer, & Todak, 2014). These findings collectively demonstrate that courts may perceive officers who commit only *certain types* of profit-motivated crime as morally blameworthy and particularly deserving of punishment.

Our research in the longer view may contribute to the eventual construction of conceptual models and the development of a more complete understanding of the money-making crimes of police. That is, the substantive issue for scholars and practitioners beyond our specific data and exploratory analyses remains: why do some police officers perpetrate profit-motivated police crimes; and, why do these crimes occur within all sorts of police agencies? Conceptual models to explain the profit-motivated crimes of police should perhaps begin with some understanding of the long-standing scholarship focused on the similar money-making crimes of white-collar and corporate offenders. A detailed review of this expansive literature is beyond our present goals; however, a great deal of scholarship on the motivations of white-collar offenders begins with classical theory, the concept of greed, and the common assumption that profit-motivated criminals simply "want to make a fast buck." The primary motivations are believed to encompass financial self-interests and conventional wisdom relating to the notion that "crime pays," and that these sorts of behaviors offer white-collar criminals "the easiest way to make a lot of money" (Coleman, 1992, p. 59, 1995, pp. 362–363). These same motivations also likely underpin the perpetration of many profit-motivated police crimes. A basic understanding of

these phenomenon and our data probably begins on the level of individual officers who surrendered to one of the most powerful human instincts in pursuit of their own self-interest.

Potential theories on profit-motivated police crime that focus too closely on greed, however, risk losing sight of the proverbial forest for the trees because they obscure the broader contexts that are known to influence law enforcement organizations and individual sworn officers whether they patrol urban beats, suburbs, or small towns. Classic scholarship provides the basis for much of what is known about police deviance and underscores the importance of both occupational and social forces in understanding police behavior. The occupational context of police work provides ample opportunities for misconduct including the perpetration of profit-motivated crimes (Goldstein, 1977; Kappeler et al., 1998). Officers in our dataset, for example, commonly perpetrated thefts and robberies within the context of seemingly legitimate but also low-visibility encounters that afforded secrecy, including vehicular stops or interactions involving criminal suspects during pedestrian stops, searches, or arrests. Police in our dataset also targeted certain residential and commercial properties as burglary targets based on prior knowledge of their "beat" and an observed lack of capable guardianship. Police work also provides opportunities to target victims who are vulnerable because they are alone or perceived to be easy to discredit or likely to be ignored including drug dealers, other criminal suspects, or regular citizens who are poor or undocumented or do not speak the language.

The occupational context provides criminal opportunities; and, some of the sociological traits embedded within police culture seem to neutralize potential formal and informal mechanisms of control. Cultural themes including secrecy and solidarity presumably decrease the chances that law enforcement officers who have knowledge of and/or witness police crimes will report them. Some recognized themes within police culture seem to encourage police to

define some citizens as particularly blameworthy, and hence, deserving of some retaliatory actions (Bouza, 1990; Crank, 2004; Van Maanen, 1978; Westley, 1970). The situational contexts involved in some of the profit-motivated crimes within our data could certainly be considered "retaliatory" and consistent with these themes, particularly the shakedown of drug dealers or the profit-motivated victimization of prostitutes. Taken together, these occupational and culturally-derived factors provide a framework to understand how profit-motivated police crimes occur beyond individual traits or motivation. The perpetrators are not simply greedy; they are greedy *cops* whose job provides criminal opportunities and forms of protection unavailable to regular citizens.

Our data should be considered a beginning rather than end point provided the previous absence of large available samples of profit-motivated police crimes and systematic studies on the phenomenon. One reviewer focused on the need for further development of conceptual models and the impact of tactics associated with the war on drugs and the practice of asset forfeiture. The suggestion builds on our discussion of occupationally derived opportunities and encompasses separate lines of research that identify the corrosive influences of various police strategies including aggressive pedestrian stop and frisk tactics, pretextual vehicular stops, and police confiscations of alleged proceeds or instruments of criminal activities. These lines of research describe how some police tactics defined as lawful by the state are subverted in ways that push ethical boundaries or may ultimately violate civil rights. The media accounts that are the basis of our data do not often describe how the arrest of an individual officer or group of officers may be associated with the larger goals of the state or the enforcement strategies of the police organization, so conclusions in this regard are beyond the scope of our data. The cases within our dataset are more clear-cut; these are police who were arrested based on probable

cause to believe they had knowingly engaged in illegal money-making criminal offenses for personal profit.

Our suggestions for future research instead focus on the need to address some of the more immediate limitations of our news-based methodology. One limitation is the obvious absence of information on victim-related variables. Data on victim age and their relationship to the arrested officer for example were missing for the vast majority of cases in the current study (97% and 76.5% respectively). News organizations generally do not report the names and other personal identifiers of crime victims. The need to protect victim identity is probably more acute in the case that the perpetrator is a police officer. The absence of victim information obviously hampers our understanding of these phenomena, particularly since we suspect that officers target specific victims based on their perceived vulnerability to profit-motivated crimes. Future research based on content analysis of news-based videos rather than text may provide additional victim-related data with regard to these and other types of police crimes. A second limitation is the comparative absence of situational and place-based data. Scholars have increasingly focused on the criminology of place in order to advance theory and mitigate a wide range of crimes (Weisburd, Groff, & Yang, 2012). These approaches have the potential to also increase our understanding of profit-motivated police crimes through analyses focused on the identification of crime patterns, the concentration of available criminal opportunities to police, and the degree to which police perpetrators operate in ways similar to other profit-motivated criminals. Our final suggestion is based on the need for more individual-level data on the mechanisms that push some police to commit profit-motivated crimes. Officers may experience a broad range of issues that could encourage them to engage in money-making crimes such as personal financial insecurity, the build-up of job-related stress, and/or ongoing exposure to the profit-motivated criminal

behavior of other police officers. Scholars currently lack any sort of systematic data on the individual-level motivations of police who perpetrate profit-motivated crimes beyond our presumptions based on classic theory and conventional wisdom on the operation of greed.

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**Table 1. Profit-motivated Police Crime Arrest Cases, 2005-2011: Arrested Officers and Employing Agencies (N = 1,591)**

	<i>n</i>	(%)		<i>n</i>	(%)		<i>n</i>	(%)
Sex			Officer Duty Status			Agency Type		
Male	1,497	(94.1)	On-Duty	1,093	(68.7)	Primary State Police	62	(3.9)
Female	94	(5.9)	Off-Duty	498	(31.3)	Sheriff's Office	251	(15.8)
Age			Rank			County Police Dept.	66	(4.2)
19-23	24	(1.5)	Officer	1,132	(71.2)	Municipal Police Dept.	1,162	(73.0)
24-27	137	(8.6)	Detective	111	(7.0)	Special Police Dept.	42	(2.6)
28-31	207	(13.0)	Corporal	25	(1.6)	Constable	7	(0.4)
32-35	233	(14.6)	Sergeant	141	(8.9)	Tribal Police Dept.	1	(0.1)
36-39	244	(15.3)	Lieutenant	42	(2.6)	Regional Police Dept.	0	(0.0)
40-43	231	(14.5)	Captain	18	(1.1)	Full-Time Sworn Officers		
44-47	144	(9.1)	Major	5	(0.3)	0	7	(0.4)
48-51	90	(5.7)	Colonel	2	(0.1)	1	16	(1.0)
52-55	48	(3.0)	Deputy Chief	18	(1.1)	2-4	67	(4.2)
56 or older	62	(3.9)	Chief	97	(6.1)	5-9	77	(4.9)
Missing	171	(10.8)	Function			10-24	176	(11.1)
Years of Service			Patrol & Street Level	1,243	(78.1)	25-49	152	(9.6)
0-2	148	(9.3)	Line/Field Supervisor	208	(13.1)	50-99	167	(10.5)
3-5	197	(12.4)	Management	140	(8.8)	100-249	169	(10.6)
6-8	162	(10.2)	Region of United States			250-499	161	(10.1)
9-11	155	(9.7)	Northeastern States	362	(22.8)	500-999	104	(6.5)
12-14	126	(7.9)	Midwestern States	329	(20.7)	1,000 or more	495	(31.1)
15-17	104	(6.5)	Southern States	726	(45.6)	Part-Time Sworn Officers		
18-20	111	(7.0)	Western States	174	(10.9)	0	1,209	(76.)
21-23	55	(3.5)	Level of Rurality			1	46	(2.9)
24-26	25	(1.6)	Metropolitan County	1,312	(82.5)	2-4	104	(6.5)
27 or more years	43	(2.7)	Non-Metro County	279	(17.5)	5-9	111	(7.0)
Missing	465	(29.2)				10-24	94	(5.9)
Arresting Agency						25-49	19	(1.2)
Employing Agency	510	(32.1)				50-99	6	(0.3)
Another Agency	1,081	(67.9)				100-249	1	(0.1)
						250-499	1	(0.1)

**Table 2. Most Serious Offense Charged in Profit-motivated Police Crime Arrest Cases, 2005-2011** (*N* = 1,591)

	<i>n</i>	(%)		<i>n</i>	(%)
Unclassified Theft / Larceny	255	(16.0)	Wire Fraud	9	(0.6)
False Pretenses / Swindle	199	(12.5)	Gambling: Operating / Promoting	9	(0.6)
Drug / Narcotic violation	189	(11.9)	Simple Assault	7	(0.4)
Robbery	103	(6.4)	Motor Vehicle Theft	7	(0.4)
Theft from Building	92	(5.8)	Credit Card Fraud / ATM Fraud	6	(0.4)
Extortion / Blackmail	85	(5.3)	Murder & Nonnegligent Manslaughter	5	(0.3)
Embezzlement	77	(4.8)	Assisting or Promoting Prostitution	4	(0.3)
Burglary / Breaking & Entering	72	(4.5)	Evidence: Destroying / Tampering	4	(0.3)
Bribery	56	(3.5)	Gambling: Betting / Wagering	3	(0.2)
All Other Offenses	49	(3.1)	Theft of Motor Vehicle Parts / Accessories	3	(0.2)
False Report / False Statement	46	(2.9)	Kidnapping / Abduction	2	(0.1)
Weapons Law violation	40	(2.5)	Unclassified Sex Crime	2	(0.1)
Counterfeiting / Forgery	39	(2.5)	Welfare Fraud	1	(0.1)
Stolen Property Offenses	38	(2.4)	Pocket-Picking	1	(0.1)
Shoplifting	31	(1.9)	Theft from a Coin-operated Machine	1	(0.1)
Official Misconduct / Oppression / Violation of Oath	29	(1.8)	Prostitution	1	(0.1)
Civil Rights violation	26	(1.6)	Forcible Sodomy	1	(0.1)
Intimidation	21	(1.3)	Forcible Fondling	1	(0.1)
Theft from Motor Vehicle	21	(1.3)	Bad Checks	1	(0.1)
Arson	16	(1.0)	Disorderly Conduct	1	(0.1)
Impersonation	14	(0.9)	Family Offenses, nonviolent	1	(0.1)
Obstruction of Justice	11	(0.7)	Liquor Law violation	1	(0.1)
Aggravated Assault	10	(0.6)	Wiretapping, illegal	1	(0.1)

**Table 3. Victim Characteristics in Profit-motivated Police Crime Arrest Cases, 2005-2011 (N = 1,591)**

	<i>n</i>	(%)	(Valid %)		<i>n</i>	(%)	(Valid %)
<b>Victim's Sex</b>				<b>Victim's Relationship</b>			
Female	71	(4.4)	(26.7)	Current Spouse	1	(0.1)	(0.3)
Male	195	(83.3)	(73.3)	Former Spouse	4	(0.3)	(1.1)
Missing	1,325	(16.7)		Current Girlfriend or Boyfriend	1	(0.1)	(0.3)
<b>Victim's Age</b>				Former Girlfriend or Boyfriend	6	(0.4)	(1.6)
Birth-11	0	(0.0)	(0.0)	Child or Stepchild	0	(0.0)	(0.0)
12-13	1	(0.1)	(2.2)	Some Other Relative	5	(0.3)	(1.3)
14-15	0	(0.0)	(0.0)	Unrelated Child	6	(0.4)	(1.6)
16-17	2	(0.1)	(4.3)	Stranger or Acquaintance	350	(21.9)	(93.8)
18-19	1	(0.1)	(2.2)	Missing	1,218	(76.5)	
20-24	9	(0.6)	(19.5)	<b>Victim's Law Enforcement Status</b>			
25-32	11	(0.7)	(24.0)	Victim is Not a Police Officer	358	(22.5)	(96.8)
33-41	9	(0.6)	(19.5)	Victim is a Police Officer	12	(0.8)	(3.2)
42 or older	13	(0.8)	(28.3)	Missing	1,221	(76.7)	
Missing	1,545	(97.0)		<b>Victim Adult or Child</b>			
				Adult	374	(23.5)	(98.2)
				Child	7	(0.4)	(1.8)
				Missing	1,210	(76.1)	



**Table 4. Profit-motivated Police Crime Arrest Cases: Logistic Regression Model Predicting Conviction (N = 197)**

	<i>B</i>	<i>SE</i>	Wald	<i>p</i>	Exp(B)	95% CI for Exp(B)	
						<i>LL</i>	<i>UL</i>
Type of Agency	0.519	0.224	5.381	.020	1.681	1.084	2.606
State	0.070	0.020	12.566	< .001	1.073	1.032	1.115
Part-time Sworn Personnel (categorical)	-0.318	0.160	3.931	.047	0.728	0.532	0.996
Violence-related	1.666	0.732	5.177	.023	5.292	1.260	22.234
Officer's Chief is Under Scrutiny	-3.293	1.398	5.549	.018	0.037	0.002	0.575
Drugs: Shakedown / Theft from Off-duty Robbery	-4.517	2.035	4.927	.026	0.011	0.000	0.589
Drugs: Any Shakedown / Theft	4.702	1.648	8.141	.004	110.177	4.358	2785.279
Job Lost	3.187	0.679	22.041	< .001	24.216	6.401	91.605
Victim Age Categorical	-0.357	0.123	8.439	.004	0.700	0.550	0.890
- 2 Log Likelihood	133.494						
Model Chi-Square	82.984			<.001			
Cox & Snell $R^2$	.344						
Nagelkerke $R^2$	.516					95% CI for AUC	
ROC $R^2$	.186					<i>LL</i>	<i>UL</i>
AUC	.593					.547	.639




Figure 1. Profit-motivated Arrest Cases: CART Model Predicting Conviction