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Populist Parties in Germany, France, and the UK: Growing Support for a Radical Rejection of Globalization?

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Abstract

A mere look at electoral results on both the national and European level of many European countries shows that populist and right-wing parties’ support has been growing extensively. The French Front National (FN), which has made significant strides since Marine Le Pen took over the party’s leadership, is often seen as on the forefront of this movement, and is deemed to be a core part of the contemporary European extreme right. Although their individual agendas and rhetoric differ from that of the FN, the UK Independence Party (UKIP) and the German Alternative für Deutschland (Alternative for Germany, AfD) are often placed in the same party family. Disregarding this hotly debated terminology, however, this paper seeks to identify specific differences and overlaps among the three parties. Examining specific agenda points, most prominently their anti-immigration rhetoric and stance toward the EU, the party programs are used as a starting point to assess to what extent the three parties can justifiably be classified as part of an anti-globalization movement.

Prior to examining the parties’ positions concerning specific issues, an influx in immigration, increased integration into the European Union, resulting in a transfer of some national powers to the supranational level, as well as growing xenophobia, Islamophobia, and anti-Americanism have sometimes been identified as consequences of globalization; negative attitudes toward this development, increased nationalism, and policy proposals designed to halt these effects were deemed as highly indicative of a radical rejection of globalization. Following a comparative analysis of the three parties’ positions, the discussion shows that the French “Front National” fulfills the given criteria to a much greater extent than the other two, and its ethnic-based, Francocentric rhetoric is much more extreme than that of its counterparts. Nevertheless, a future radicalization in the UK and Germany is conceivable, particularly since Islamophobia is especially pronounced in the three countries under investigation, and as refugee crises in the Mediterranean Sea are leading to an increased foreign presence in said countries, perhaps sparking similar ethnic intolerance as is propagated by the FN.
**Introduction & Rationale**

The issue of increasing political support for right-wing parties in Europe is important because it signals a distressing dissatisfaction with the current political system. It is especially important that such a movement, primarily directed against the cultural elements of globalization, is forming in Europe, where citizens of all member states benefit from freedom of movement and numerous other advantages of European integration. But clearly, national and regional identities have not been superseded by a common European identity, and thus continue to play an important role in national politics, especially in the language used by right-wing parties. Additionally, overcrowding and other negative effects associated with immigration, as well as the 2008 financial crisis, have further sown doubts about the European project. As a result, this project seeks to analyze to what extent a select few parties could be considered a part of this movement against globalization.

In general, radical right-wing parties are continuing to cement their support in many European democracies, with France’s aggressive *Front National* (FN) being on the forefront of the discussion about this development. Up until recently, Germany was thought to be the exception to Europe-wide radicalization with extreme right-wing parties’ limited electoral successes contained to subnational levels and vocal anti-immigration and anti-EU positions less visible at the national level. This changed in 2013, when the Alternative for Germany AfD, a newly formed party, campaigned for a fundamental reorganization of the Eurozone and has since made headlines for expressing sympathy for supporters of the German *Pegida* movement. Likewise, UKIP, vocal about drastically reducing immigration and known for its anti-EU rhetoric, has made electoral advances in UK elections in the last few years.
Undoubtedly, FN, UKIP and AfD differ significantly regarding their histories, political agendas and party structures. In fact, FN is widely regarded as a right-wing party\(^1\), while UKIP’s and the AfD’s membership in the far-right Populist Party family is more contested\(^2\). Nevertheless, they share many similarities in that they have emerged as a strong opposition force to established parties in the mainstream and consider themselves to be the true voice of the people. An in-depth analysis of policy positions is thus necessary to assess to what extent these parties’ platforms can be deemed a radical reaction to globalization. Indicators for such a response would primarily be calls for far-reaching limits on immigration and Islamophobic rhetoric. Additionally, Euro-skepticism as an emerging ideology must also be examined in its varying appearances, with anti-American sentiments examined as another possible manifestation of anti-globalization attitudes.

**Methodology**

The present study relies heavily on qualitative approaches, as its primary goal is to compare the three parties’ positions on immigration, and to assess whether they can be deemed Islamophobic or racist, whether Euro-skepticism is a pervasive characteristic, and whether anti-American sentiment can be observed. Thus, in addition to secondary source material, the study draws from the parties’ own websites and interviews with their leader to gain a better understanding of the parties’ standpoints on said issues. Regarding the French *Front National*, there is more reliance on interviews and secondary sources, as their website is not published in English. However, quantitative data is also included in order to examine how the three countries’ public support for said issues compares to the parties themselves, and whether anti-globalization sentiments are
restricted to populist parties or more pervasively observable among the general public. This part of the analysis draws from Eurobarometer surveys and other polling agencies’ data.

**Literature Review**

Much has been written about the French *Front National* (FN), while the UK Independence Party (UKIP) has only lately received significant popularity, and the German Alternative for Germany (*Alternative für Deutschland*, AfD) itself is only just over two years old. Taking these developments into account, I will attempt to provide a balanced summary and analysis of books and journal articles addressing each one of the three parties and their connection to globalization.

Edward G. DeClair’s *Politics on the Fringe: The People, Policies, and Organization of the French National Front* examines the party’s voter base and agenda in detail. Exploring the *Front’s* agenda, the author argues that “the party has modified its political message to profit from a growing sense of French anxiousness about the country’s political and economic future”, while asserting that reducing the party’s political agenda to the sole issue of immigration does not hold up in light of “detailed, face-to-face interviews with the core leadership of the Front (145).” DeClair not only explores which issues are important to the *Front*, but also analyzes to what extent the party’s claim to “really say what all French men and women are actually thinking” (117) holds true by contrasting important issues identified by the Front’s elite with the French public’s views according to Euro-Barometer. Even though his chart shows that the public’s view differs significantly from the *Front’s* on some issues, the author is correct to claim that the *Front’s* assertion that it speaks on behalf of its countrymen and women is not too far-fetched given that there is an alarming overlap in “divisive political issues such as immigration, security and violence, and racism, issues that have in fact served as the Front’s philosophical and
While DeClair’s analysis also showed that “the National Front is most out of touch with the total French electorate when it comes to issues dealing with moral concerns” (130), the public’s apparent shared concern for the aforementioned issues, which are essential to the FN’s identity, is especially important for the purpose of this research project. DeClair’s findings that immigration “was the leading political problem facing France” (134) according to the Front’s leadership and supporters must then be analyzed within the framework of the FN’s contemporary agenda. Thus, while DeClair’s conclusions concerning the party’s platform may not be entirely applicable given the changes it underwent since Marine Le Pen has become the party’s president, they provide a relevant historic overview of the party’s anti-globalization sentiments. Simon Bornschier’s Cleavage Politics and the Populist Right: The New Cultural Conflict in Western Europe argues that European right-wing parties, particularly the FN in France, have benefited greatly from a shifting emphasis away from economics and towards a new cultural divide. Specifically, he refers to a new cultural cleavage having formed during the 1960s that “pits universalistic conceptions of community against traditional, nationalistic ones” and has strengthened right-wing parties’ ability to mobilize supporters regardless of their socioeconomic status. Applying this framework of libertarian-universalistic vs traditionalist-communitarian values, Bornschier finds that the FN has been “situated at the extreme of the political spectrum” “farthest away from cultural liberalism” (40) with its opposition to immigration as one of its defining features. Published prior to the AfD’s establishment in 2013, Bornschier’s study notes that “the [German] Union’s [CDU] location is similar to the location occupied by the populist right in other countries and, in fact, appears to leave little room for populist right parties (46).” While Bornschier’s emphasis on a cultural divide explains the FN’s increased popularity in recent years, it does not appear to have foreseen the emergence of the
AfD, a party whose platform Germany’s traditional political parties have criticized as populist and nationalist, but which emphasizes its classical liberal policy proposals. Nevertheless, Bornschier’s framework is useful for this research project, as anti-immigration sentiments and Islamophobia have undoubtedly contributed to the Front National’s emergence as a serious political contender in France, and to UKIP’s significant electoral successes in Great Britain.

Turning away from France and towards Germany, Arzheimer’s article, “The AfD: Finally a Successful Right-Wing Party in Europe?,” takes a closer look at the AfD’s manifesto for its participation in the 2014 elections for the European Parliament. Specifically, Arzheimer analyses frequently-used terms in the manifesto for their potential overlap with other German parties’ priorities and in order to gain a greater understanding of the party’s position along the ideological spectrum. Compared to the eight other political parties’ top five words used, Arzheimer finds that “the party’s manifesto places it firmly at the far right of the political spectrum” (544). Against the backdrop of right-wing extremism and populism, however, Arzheimer asserts that “the section on immigration and asylum also strikes a rather conciliatory tone” (545), which along with its modest demands in other relevant areas prompt him to conclude that the “AfD is therefore not a Radical Right, let alone an Extreme Right party” (546) and that “there is nothing in the manifesto that would appear as particularly populist in that sense” (546). Lastly, Arzheimer finds that “[r]emarkably, the AfD shows an unusual degree of sympathy for Russia and distrust for the US (548).” Arzheimer’s analysis shows that the AfD’s 2014 manifesto is far more restrained than, for example, the much more aggressively nationalist FN. Despite its comparably cautious positions on immigration, the statements made in last year’s manifesto do not take into account the party’s expressed support for Pegida. A new assessment
of the AfD’s policy positions as well as its leadership’s publicly communicated attitudes toward the concept of “cultural differentialism,” which Bornschier defines as “not claiming the superiority of any nationality or race but, instead, stressing the right of peoples to preserve their distinctive traditions” (23) is thus in order.

Almost sandwiched in between the more restrained AfD and the radical FN, UKIP has become a significant force in British politics. Although Britain is not known for the kinds of Europhile attitudes expressed by mainstream parties in continental Europe, “UKIP is identified with the current of ‘hard’ Euro-scepticism, also called ‘Euro-rejectionism’, which rejects both the principle of ever closer union as well as the current state of the EU institutions”.6 In its opposition to the EU as a force preventing the UK from engaging in “genuine free trade”7 and whose membership “holds us back in the world” (7). UKIP clearly uses the language of economic globalization to emphasize its positions. Despite the party’s espousal of classic free trade positions, however, UKIP engages in an “exclusionary [rather than globalist] rhetoric”8 when it comes to immigration, painting the issue “as a threat to effective nationhood itself” (193). Consequently, EU membership is linked to free movement and mass immigration, thereby “flooding” the UK, whilst simultaneously shackling the UK economically. While the advancement of nativist causes is clearly on UKIP’s agenda, existing literature has thus far not suggested the party is blatantly racist or fascist, unlike the British National Party (BNP). In fact, “the attitudes of UKIP voters in the 2009 European Parliament elections fell squarely between the Conservatives and the BNP on core radical right issues: xenophobic hostility to immigrants; populist hostility to elites; and racial prejudice against minorities,”9 making UKIP a more
moderate force than the radical right British National Party (BNP), but a more aggressively xenophobic one than other established parties. According to Ford, UKIP-leader Nigel Farage’s ability to “raise similar contentious questions about immigration, Islam and identity in mainstream political forums” (Ford) without inviting comparisons to fascism are due to “his roots in a more legitimate tradition of Eurosceptic politics” (Ford). Drawing support mainly from the working class, “British-born and [those] that seem socially, culturally, economically, and spatially distant from immigration hotspots such as London,” UKIP is further united with the AfD and FN in its claim to speak on behalf of their fellow countrymen and women, cleverly inserting language about elitism and the political establishment’s obliviousness to their people’s needs.

Analysis

After reviewing existing literature on each of the three parties in question and loosely exploring their connection to anti-globalization sentiments, this subsequent section examines and compares specific policy positions. Findings are then discussed and ultimately assessed within the framework of anti-globalization rhetoric.

Xenophobia and Islamophobia

As mentioned before, Germany is deemed a curious exception in Europe, with no strong right-wing party with clearly xenophobic tendencies among established political parties. The AfD, established only in 2013, has challenged that perception. While it has maintained that it would not form alliances with European xenophobic parties ahead of the 2014 elections for European
Parliament, its expression of sympathy for the Pegida movement, which opposes Muslim immigration in an effort to prevent what they perceive as further Islamification of the West, is indicative of general, if only mild antipathies held toward Muslim immigrants. In the wake of the terrorist attacks on Charlie Hebdo, regional AfD-leader and one of the party’s co-founders Alexander Gauland was quoted saying “This bloodbath proves that those who laughed at or ignored the fears of so many people about a looming danger of Islamism were wrong,” thereby providing further indication of the party’s xenophobic tendencies. Nevertheless, party leaders are keen to distance themselves from the xenophobic elements within Pegida and their own party, with the party’s deputy chairman expressing concerns that “it cannot be ruled out that [the demonstrations] have a xenophobic or even racist aftertaste” (es ist “nicht auszuschließen“, dass die Proteste einen „ausländerfeindlichen oder gar rassistischen Beigeschmack“ haben), which undermines the protesters’ legitimate concerns. Given the fact that high-profile members contradict one another concerning their views of Islam as an inherent threat to the West, it is difficult to evaluate whether the party can be considered Islamophobic. However, in the AfD’s official manifesto, there is no evidence of propagation of the idea of cultural differentialism, to which dominant European right-wing parties subscribe. Only once does the AfD’s party program for the election to the European Parliament in 2014 mention “the fundamental values of the Christian West.” But despite this officially subdued rhetoric, some elements within the party are distinctly more Islamophobic. As Arzheimer remarks,

But now, we’re apparently down to two “wings”: Lucke’s economic liberals (who are also socially conservative), and those who want a tougher, more nationalist party. Incidentally, this split seems to be reinforced by an East-West conflict within the AfD,
with the electorally successful Eastern chapters more inclined to play the right-wing populist card.\textsuperscript{16}

In addition to the possibility of factionalization over issues related to xenophobia, a study conducted by the Friedrich Ebert Foundation also found that “the AfD’s followers harbour above-average sympathies for nearly all facets of right-wing extremist ideology.”\textsuperscript{17} As the table below shows (translated from the foundation’s report) AfD sympathizers’ xenophobic tendencies were almost twice as pronounced as those of the conservative CDU’s supporters\textsuperscript{18}. Thus, while xenophobic elements are not visible in the party’s program, they have certainly shaped the discussion, indicating that xenophobia may take up a greater role in the future.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>CDU/CSU\textsuperscript{1} (n=384)</th>
<th>SPD\textsuperscript{2} (n=352)</th>
<th>FDP\textsuperscript{3} (n=100)</th>
<th>The Greens (n=238)</th>
<th>The Left (n=147)</th>
<th>NPD\textsuperscript{4} (n=17)</th>
<th>AFD\textsuperscript{5} (n=68)</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Support for dictatorship</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3.5</td>
<td>2.3</td>
<td>4.3</td>
<td>20.3</td>
<td>9.5</td>
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<tr>
<td>Chauvinism</td>
<td>14.1</td>
<td>11.9</td>
<td>15.1</td>
<td>1.5</td>
<td>3.2</td>
<td>56.2</td>
<td>41.2</td>
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<tr>
<td>Xenophobia</td>
<td>8.8</td>
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<td>6</td>
<td>72.8</td>
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<tr>
<td>Anti-Semitism</td>
<td>4.7</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0.8</td>
<td>0.8</td>
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<td>30</td>
<td>9</td>
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<tr>
<td>Social Darwinism</td>
<td>4.1</td>
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<tr>
<td>Belittlement of National Socialism</td>
<td>1.3</td>
<td>0.9</td>
<td>3.2</td>
<td>1.4</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>14</td>
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Legend: \textsuperscript{1} Christian Democratic Union/Christian Social Union, \textsuperscript{2} Social Democratic Party of Germany, \textsuperscript{3} Free Democratic Party, \textsuperscript{4} National Democratic Party of Germany, \textsuperscript{5} Alternative for Germany

Table 1: Right-Wing Attitudes among Survey Participants with different Party Associations. Numbers are percentages. http://www.fes-gegen-rechtsextremismus.de/pdf_14/FragileMitte-FeindseligeZustaende.pdf

In contrast to the AfD, the case of the French Front National is less ambiguous. Under Marine Le Pen’s father Jean-Marie’s leadership, the party was more vehemently anti-Semitic, an image his
daughter is now feverishly trying to repair, even if broad segments of the party’s electorate display anti-Semitic views to a much greater extent than the French political mainstream. But despite Le Pen’s current efforts to “to ‘de-demonize’ the FN by banishing outright racists from the party and abandoning the scarcely coded anti-Semitic and Islam-baiting language of her father,” the party’s political agenda clearly emphasizes Frenchness and seeks to exclude foreign elements in their different manifestations, most prominently, however, by severely restricting immigration and non-French citizens’ access to social services. It is especially the focus on African immigrants that exposes the Front National’s xenophobic traits. But even legal non-citizens already residing in France will be affected by the Front National’s nationalist policies, as the party aims to require citizenship in order to qualify for services such as family benefits, an essential component of the French social security system. In addition to xenophobia in more general terms, the FN has also been closely associated with Islamophobia, which has been on the rise in France, a country whose commitment to laïcité (secularism) is an integral part of its self-understanding. Le Pen has addressed the matter, saying that Islam and French values are principally compatible, if “all demands that aim to shatter secularism – demands for different clothes, demands for special food, demands for prayer rooms [are opposed]. Demands that create special rules that would allow Muslims to behave differently.” Hence, it is appropriate to apply Bornschier’s idea of cultural differentialism, since belonging to the Muslim faith appears acceptable only if the de facto state religion of laïcité is adopted. Only fully assimilated Muslims, or immigrants as a whole, can be considered French. Such radical opposition to multiculturalism and the disregard of any possible benefits of foreign cultural influences, clearly in line with the FN’s notion of French exceptionalism, can definitely be interpreted as a manifestation of xenophobia.
Like the *Front National* and the AfD, UKIP, too, has had to fight against claims that it is racist and xenophobic. Even in its official party program, it notes “even our prime ministers have labelled good, decent people ‘closet racists’ and ‘bigots.’” These allegations and the party’s proposed limits on immigration have forced UKIP to state explicitly that “Immigration is not about race; it is about space” (UKIP, 11) in their party program. Whether UKIP is indeed racist remains a hotly debated topic in the UK, with a *BBC* article, for example, writing that “UKIP would scrap much of the legislation designed to prevent racial discrimination in work”\(^\text{25}\) a statement that UKIP-leader Nigel Farage claims “had been ‘willfully misinterpreted’” (*BBC News*). Nevertheless, UKIP faces similar allegations of racism as the AfD, a problem for the party that has been exacerbated by the fact that the party’s image has continuously been tainted by the emergence of party members’ racist or sexist comments, particularly on social media.\(^\text{26}\)

**Anti-Immigration Policies**

Considering the three parties’ specific immigration reform proposals, there are both decisive differences and clear overlaps. Clearly, the FN displays the most unreserved attitudes towards enacting strict limits. Whereas the AfD, for example, uses more equivocal language to illustrate its position on extra-European immigration, nevertheless expressing a fear that foreigners are immigrating “into the German social systems,” the *Front National*’s views are, according to the English language summary provided by *France24*, much more overtly protectionist. Unlike UKIP and the AfD, which advocate for the continued immigration of highly-skilled persons, the *Front National* seeks to restrict immigration to nominal amounts (10,000 per year) without a clear regard for professional qualifications. The FN’s anti-EU sentiments are also evidenced by its rejection of the Schengen Agreement which permits the free movement of persons across the
Reinstating national borders across the EU would also have consequences for immigration and give France the ability to set its own policies regarding the issue autonomously. Particularly controversial is the FN’s proposal to “Ban dual nationality for non-Europeans, which would particularly affect citizens of former French colonies in Africa” (France24).

The party’s tough stance on immigration and indeed its specific proposals are extremely similar to those of UKIP. For the British party, leaving the European Union is of principal importance and emphasized throughout its manifesto; clearly, this intention also finds application in its immigration reform proposals. Like the FN, UKIP seeks to cap immigration and highlights the fact that it supports a non-discriminatory approach that no longer allows for preferential treatment of European immigrants as part of Schengen. Distinctly different from the FN, however, is the fact that UKIP considers immigration a vital necessity with clear benefits if controlled, insisting, “Immigration is not about race: it is about space. Immigrants are not the problem, it is the current immigration system that is broken” (UKIP, 10).

For the German AfD, immigration reform is an important part of their program, too, but its proposals are markedly less strict than the others. The 2014 program acknowledges the need for greater immigration given demographic developments within Germany. Like UKIP, which seeks to ensure that “all new migrants to Britain will have to make tax and national insurance contributions for five consecutive years before they will become eligible to claim UK benefits, or [have] access to more than non-urgent NHS services (UKIP, 12), and even specifically identifies “health tourism” as a significant enough problem (UKIP, 16), the AfD expresses concerns about “immigration into the German social systems”. To combat this apparent development, the AfD
proposes that in Germany, too, benefits should be given only to those who “have paid taxes or made social security payments in Germany to a considerable extent, or if their parents have done so” (AfD, 15). Another similarity between the British and German parties’ policy proposals is their joint support for the adoption of an immigration law based on a point system on the Canadian model and which equally takes into account German [or British, respectively] interests and “the likelihood that the immigrants will be able to integrate successfully into our society” (AfD, 15). Moreover, the AfD is also concerned about EU intrusion into German legislation concerning immigration (15), but emphasizes solely the need for stricter extra-European immigration controls, with intended limits on intra-European immigration not explicitly mentioned.

**Anti-Euro and/or Anti-EU Sentiments**

According to its 2014 party manifesto, they AfD perceives the introduction of a uniform monetary policy as a “disaster (4), alleging “the single currency euro destroys Europe’s foundation. It generates strife and resurrects national prejudices. Welfare and peace among the member states in the euro zone are endangered” (AfD, 4). As a solution, co-founder Lucke proposes the exclusion of economically poorly performing Southern European countries, above all Greece, from the Eurozone, which would allow said states to emerge with more positive trade balances, make them more competitive, and allow them to initiate their own financial reforms independent of the EU.\(^{30}\) Not only would a smaller monetary union that excludes Greece and other states benefit Germany and other economic powerhouses; an unwillingness to further support bailout packages would, according to Lucke, lead to Greece’s voluntary, not forced,
withdrawal from the Eurozone, freeing it from imposed austerity measures and allowing greater self-determination in establishing economic policies (Lucke and Snowen).

Lucke and his party’s demands for greater democratization of EU institutions and transparency, too, are related to the perceived detrimental introduction of the euro in member-states who had not met the Economic and Monetary Union’s (EMU) convergence criteria. The AfD’s commitment to profound revisions of the European monetary union is evident throughout their entire manifesto. Criticizing the European Union’s democratic deficit directly relates to its imposition of austerity measures in southern European countries alongside the International Monetary Fund and the European Central Bank. Warning about the emergence of a “United States of Europe,” the AfD alleges that measures designed to rescue the euro at seemingly whatever cost are “not subject to any significant parliamentary control. [European institutions] are the large pillars undergirding the construction of a European economic regime, to erect a centralistic, bureaucratic and technocratic European super state that is too remote from the citizens and undemocratic.”

Resonating with this language, FN leader Le Pen goes even further, speaking of a “European Soviet Union.” The difference between the AfD’s and FN’s views concerning the EU are nevertheless enormous. While the AfD’s manifesto indicates an understanding for other states that have expressed a desire to leave “this EU,” it advocates for an expansion of citizen-led initiatives based on the Swiss model as well as for reforms aimed at democratization and increased transparency on the EU-level (AfD, 10). Le Pen, on the other hand, admits to “want[ing] to destroy the EU.” While the AfD makes the euro and the disastrous effects of a
uniform monetary policy responsible for cross-European conflict, Le Pen charges that “Europe is war. Economic war. It is the increase of hostilities between the countries. . . That is not brotherhood” (Rohr). These problems are so fundamental that they cannot be solved by a mere reorganization of the Eurozone, only the introduction of a “Europe of nation-states” (Rohr) and the complete dissolution of the European Union would accomplish these goals. In the party’s manifesto, these radical ideas become pronounced in the FN’s commitment to “re-negotiate all EU treaties in order to claw back national sovereignty”.

Dedicated to rejecting EU-initiated compromises to its national sovereignty and to restoring fully its autonomy within Europe, the FN curiously seeks the establishment of “a Pan-European Union of Sovereign States, to include Russia and Switzerland, but specifically not Turkey” (France24), a proposal that must be further analyzed within the context of anti-Americanism below.

For UKIP, clearly, the present situation it seeks to change is notably different from that of Germany and France, which have adopted the common European currency. Hence, its proposals more closely resemble those of the FN than the euro-wary AfD. UKIP’s yearning for past times, where Britain was a global political superpower, manifests itself in its political program for this year’s British elections, UKIP Manifesto 2015. Specifically, it worries that “The longer we stay in the European Union, the more we become like ‘little Englanders,’ an isolated, insignificant, offshore province in a country called Europe. We become less and less like the ‘Great’ Britain we really are”.

For UKIP, EU membership is directly associated with uncontrolled immigration resulting in higher unemployment rates, a sheer mass of environmental, occupational, and other regulations whose “burden can be overwhelming for small firms” (UKIP, 44) and, particularly as EU-membership was expanded to former Communist states in Central and Eastern Europe, a
decline in its political vote share. Additionally, it complains about the financial burden EU membership poses to the UK as a net contributor, alleging that leaving the EU would allow the country to “Save £9 billion a year” (UKIP, 8).

Anti-Americanism

Given a general association of the United States with globalization, particularly in the realms of popular culture, technology, and economics, anti-American attitudes would be a good indicator that the parties under examination are vehicles of anti-globalization. Conversely, however, UKIP clearly expresses a desire to “foster closer ties with the Anglosphere” (UKIP, 67), which is described as a “network of nations that share not merely our language but our common law, democratic traditions and global trading interests (UKIP, 67). Nevertheless, UKIP is a staunch supporter of increased national sovereignty, which it, like Le Pen, views as inherently encroached upon by the EU. As a result, UKIP’s manifesto speaks very critically about military endeavors conducted as part of the US-initiated “War on Terror.” Military excursions abroad are understood as “a sign that our political leaders are willing to put our troops in harm’s way at the behest of other countries’ political agendas (UKIP, 67). Clearly, improved American-British relationships would be pursued by a UKIP-led government, even if this would mean that support of American-led military actions may be more hesitant. Nevertheless, it deserves mention that while it is committed to greater political, economic, and military autonomy, UKIP repeatedly declares its continued support for NATO in its manifesto.

Likewise, the AfD professes its desire to maintain an intimate security relationship with the US, stating “NATO is and remains the bond of a transatlantic security architecture whose crucial
anchor is the alliance with the USA.”38 However, it also expresses a need for a closer relationship with Russia to resolve problems in Eastern Europe. However, a resolution passed that calls for an end to European sanctions imposed on Russia, and to abstain from further measures designed to bind Ukraine and EU or Ukraine and Russia closer together, has led some to charge the party with anti-Americanism.39 The debate about a more pro-American or pro-Russian course appears to divide the AfD deeply, and opinions differ significantly among even the party leadership, as a Die Welt article reports.40 Despite this intra-party dispute, the AfD’s official website expresses the importance of and its commitment to westward orientation. While criticism regarding the NSA data collection scandal is not surprising, the party’s decision to “reject a binding decision approving the free trade agreement with the USA,”41 which it deems as clearly disadvantageous to Europe, alleging that it would “reduce consumer and environmental protection, legal certainty, social standards and cultural policy” (AfD, 13), can definitely be construed as evidence of anti-globalization strands within the party. More than anything, however, the issue of the proposed free trade agreement between the EU and the US is yet another highly contested matter that demonstrates the emergence of intra-party cleavages: running counter to the party’s official program, Lucke has confirmed the party’s support for the agreement42.

While UKIP is undeniably intent on further strengthening its relationship with the US, and the AfD is at least officially committed to maintaining close ties with its biggest Atlantic ally, the FN pursues a decidedly different course. “Aggressive promotion of the French language internationally to restore French influence abroad” is one policy that is designed to curb especially American influence across the globe; like UKIP, the FN appears to aim to reestablish
its former glory as a global empire. Not only is Le Pen’s party vehemently opposed to the spread of American culture, it is also wary of its political might, explaining that

The Americans are trying to expand their influence in the world, particularly in Europe. They are defending their own interests, not ours. I am in favor of a multi-polar world in which France once again takes its position as the leader of non-aligned states, not with the US, not with Russia and not with Germany. One should strive to be neither slave nor master.43

Given her open antipathy for the US and its influence, it comes as no surprise that Le Pen favors France’s withdrawal from NATO, and has declared that the FN’s and Russia’s foreign policy positions are in complete agreement.44

Discussion

Given each party’s established position on the four criteria selected for this paper, one can draw conclusions about whether they could justifiably be labeled the political frontrunners of national anti-globalization movements. Clearly, the French Front National is the most extreme of the three, and its radical policy proposals diverge quite considerably from the country’s mainstream parties. Unlike the FN, France’s biggest parties, the Socialists and UMP, are committed to EU integration and have promoted the euro as a common currency. In other areas, however, the FN’s positions, though radicalized, appear more in tune with general French attitudes. France is well-known for its aggressive pursuit of laïcité that has already resulted in the ban of conspicuously religious symbols in public schools, as well as an act prohibiting facial concealment in the public, both of which were initiated by the conservative UMP and not the FN. These two laws can be viewed as “illustrative examples of the tense public climate regarding religious diversity.
and Islam”. Hence, the FN’s aggressive policy positions, particularly on the immigration issue, may resonate more broadly among the French public, making the party more mainstream than an initial assessment may indicate. It is particularly the FN’s emphasis on Frenchness and French cultural superiority, its proposals to curb government programs benefitting non-citizens, and its anti-American stance that indicate a rejection of all forms of otherness, an idea that is clearly associated with anti-globalization. Moreover, considering the electoral gains Le Pen’s party has made under her new leadership, it is doubtful whether the FN’s nationalist attitudes can be viewed as merely a development on the fringes of French society.

UKIP, similarly seeking greater national sovereignty and a restriction of immigration, could potentially also qualify as a leader of the British anti-globalization movement. There are, however, distinct differences that make such a designation seem erroneous and premature. A brief look at FN’s domestic economic policies, although not specifically addressed in this paper, shows that it seeks a much more protectionist approach than UKIP, which is politically and economically more internationally oriented. Of great importance regarding the matter at hand is also UKIP’s professed support for immigration in general, although under much stricter guidelines. In its manifesto, the party specifically stresses that immigration is beneficial and necessary for the UK, a striking difference to the French party’s adoption of what Bornschier describes as cultural differentialism. It is precisely the FN’s rejection of the other that makes it so distinctly anti-globalist. Because UKIP’s approach to these matters differs significantly, it should not be classified as principally anti-globalist, even if it contains elements that are more in line with the FN’s thinking.
An analysis of the AfD’s official party program shows a more restrained approach to German policy issues than the one pursued by the FN and even UKIP. A firm supporter of the continuation of a European monetary union, albeit thoroughly modified, the German party does not oppose the transfer of some national autonomy to the EU in principal. Moreover, its proposed immigration policy ought to be viewed as a response to globalization and to the rise in migrants across the world as a necessary consequence, and not inevitably as a negative and hostile reply. After all, even Germany’s mainstream parties have declared their intent to reform the country’s current policy on immigration and asylum given the rise in numbers. However, considering the party’s increasing factionalization over agenda points outside of the agreed-upon economic policy positions, it remains to be seen whether the AfD will lean further right in the future, or completely split into two opposing camps.

Conclusion

As the analysis shows, only the FN’s policy positions can be classified as undoubtedly anti-globalist, with UKIP and AfD displaying much more moderate tendencies on that issue. Hence, the initial misgivings that the parties’ increasing popularity – with UKIP and the FN having made formidable electoral successes – would be indicative of broader support for anti-globalist movements cannot be affirmed. Nevertheless, studies have shown an increasing prevalence of Islamophobia in Europe, with Kunst et al.’s study asserting that fear of Islamization and Islamophobia in the media is especially pronounced in all three countries examined in this paper. Consequently, a future radicalization and the adoption of dichotomous thinking, distinguishing between “them” and “us” on an ethnic, religious, or cultural basis, is conceivable...
in the UK, and to a lesser extent even in Germany, a country which, since 1945, has tended to avoid overtly patriotic gesture.
Notes

1 The author had left Bowling Green State University at the time of uploading; we were not able to confirm the editorial changes (editors’ note).


5 Alternative for Germany Party Calls for Abolition of Euro,” Deutsche Welle, last modified April 14, 2013, http://dw.de/p/18FZk


13 Justus Bender and Stefan Locke, „Kein Geheimnis mehr“ (No Secret Anymore), Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, December 10, 2014, http://www.faz.net/aktuell/politik/inland/die-naehe-der-afd-zum-islamkritischen-pegida-buendnis-13314224.html. All translations are the author’s except where otherwise noted

14 Simon Bornschier defines the concept of “cultural differentialism” as “not claiming the superiority of any nationality or race but, instead, stressing the right of peoples to preserve their distinctive traditions.” See Cleavage Politics and the Populist Right, 23


“What does France’s National Front stand for?” *France24*.

UKIP, *UKIP Manifesto 2015 – Believe in Britain*, 12.

Alternative für Deutschland, *Courage to Stand Up for Germany*, 15.


Alternative für Deutschland, *Courage to Stand Up for Germany*, 2

Mathieu von Rohr, “Interview with Marine Le Pen: 'I Don’t Want this European Soviet Union'.”

“What does France’s National Front stand for?,” *France24*.

UKIP, *UKIP Manifesto 2015 – Believe in Britain*, 63.

UKIP does not take into account, or at least does not make public the fact that the UK as the most Eurosceptic member state, thus appealing many of the policies other states would like to see implemented.

Alternative für Deutschland, *Courage to Stand Up for Germany*, 11.


41 Alternative für Deutschland, Courage to Stand Up for Germany, 13.


43 Mathieu von Rohr, “Interview with Marine Le Pen: 'I Don't Want this European Soviet Union'.”


46 Bornschier, Cleavage Politics and the Populist Right, 23.

Works Cited


